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Economic theory assigns a central role to risk preference in asset allocation. This disser-
tation includes three papers that investigate this relationship empirically. The rst paper
uses panel data on hypothetical gambles over lifetime income in the Health and Retirement
Study to quantify changes in risk tolerance over time and dierences across individuals. The
maximum-likelihood estimation of a model with correlated random eects draws on detailed
information from 12,000 respondents in the 1992-2002 HRS. The results support constant
relative risk aversion and earlier career selection based on preferences. While risk tolerance
changes with age and macroeconomic conditions, persistent dierences across individuals
account for 73% of the systematic variation in preferences. The measure of risk tolerance
also relates to actual stock ownership.
The second paper develops a measure of relative risk tolerance using responses to hypo-
thetical income gambles in the HRS. In contrast to most survey measures that produce an
ordinal metric, this paper shows how to construct a cardinal proxy for the risk tolerance
of each survey respondent. The paper also shows how to account for measurement error in
estimating this proxy and how to obtain consistent regression estimates despite the mea-
surement error. The risk tolerance proxy is shown to explain dierences in asset allocation
across households.
The third paper investigates whether the characteristics of household labor income can
account for the observed heterogeneity in nancial portfolios. Households dier substantially
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in the riskiness of their labor income and in the magnitude of their labor income relative
to their nancial assets; however, the results of this paper suggest that households do not
integrate their human capital in their nancial asset allocation. This analysis uses a direct,
household-level comparison between actual stock allocations and predicted allocations in
three economic models with dierent assumptions about labor income. When labor income
is excluded from the model, the correlation between actual and predicted stock allocations is
0.16. The inclusion of certain or risky labor income in the model leads to negative correlations
of -0.12 and -0.06 respectively. There is no evidence that households take a broad view of
wealth and diversify risks across their nancial assets and human capital.
CHAPTER II
Stability of Risk Preference
2.1 INTRODUCTION
One does not argue over tastes for the same reason that one does not argue over
the Rocky Mountains  both are there, will be there next year, too, and are the
same to all men. Stigler and Becker (1977)
This paper approaches the fundamental debate on preference stability as an empirical ques-
tion. I use a series of hypothetical gambles over lifetime income that have been elded in
the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) for more than a decade to quantify the degree and
sources of change in individual risk preferences.1 These gambles are specically designed
to measure risk preference and thus more cleanly identify the preference parameter than
standard behavioral data from surveys or experiments (Barsky, Juster, Kimball and Shapiro
1997). The gamble explicitly states the riskiness of the choices, adopts the familiar situa-
tion of a job choice, and poses large, albeit hypothetical, stakes over lifetime income. The
responses to the gambles  arguably the most objectively consistent set of risky choices
embedded in a large panel study  allow me to characterize the systematic changes in risk
tolerance over time for an individual, as well as the persistent dierences in risk tolerance
across a diverse group of individuals.
Specically, I interpret the discrete choices in the gambles as a noisy signal of the indi-
vidual's coecient of relative risk tolerance from a standard economic model, as in Barsky
et al. (1997) and Kimball et al. (2007).2 Unlike any previous analysis of these data, I use the
1The Health and Retirement Study began in 1992 as a large biennial panel survey of Americans over the age of 50 and their
spouses. Further information on the survey and the data are available at http://hrsonline.isr.umich.edu.
2The modeling of the survey response errors is particularly important here, since the gambles ask about hypothetical and
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panel of gambles to quantify systematic changes in an individual's risk tolerance. I model
risk tolerance with a time-varying component and a time-constant component. The panel of
gamble responses and other detailed information from the respondents allows me to separate
the within-person and across-person variation in preferences. Specically, I estimate a cor-
related random eects probit with 18,625 gamble responses from 12,003 individuals between
the ages of 45 and 70 across six waves of the HRS from 1992 to 2002.
The results present a nuanced view of the stability in risk preference. There is a modest
decline in risk tolerance with age and an improvement in macroeconomic conditions is associ-
ated with an increase in risk tolerance. But changes in income and wealth do not measurably
alter an individual's willingness to take risk. In addition, major life events of a job displace-
ment and the diagnosis of a serious health condition that likely reduce expected lifetime
income have little impact on measured risk tolerance. The invariance of risk tolerance to
within-person changes in income  the explicit stake of the gamble  provides support for
the specication of utility with constant relative risk aversion. While the gamble responses
reveal few sources of systematic change in risk preference, there is substantial evidence of
large persistent dierences in preferences across individuals. Demographics, including gen-
der, race, education, and marital status are all associated with signicant dierences in the
time-constant component of risk tolerance. The panel also points to the past selection of
risky careers and high debt levels based on the individual's risk tolerance type. Altogether,
the time-varying attributes account for only 27% of the systematic variation in risk toler-
ance. There are also large persistent dierences across individuals in their willingness to
take risk in the hypothetical gambles that is not explained by any of the observables. The
time-constant variance of preferences from the gambles that is unrelated to observables is
twice as large as the systematic variance of preferences.
To validate externally the results from the hypothetical income gambles, I compare my
individual measure of risk tolerance to the actual decision to own stocks. As theory predicts,
abstract scenarios from which individuals receive little nancial benet and may incur substantial costs from careful deliberation.
5
more risk tolerant individuals are more likely to own stocks and increases in an individual's
risk tolerance increase the probability of stock ownership. The individual measure of risk
tolerance also renes the standard inference on the correlates of stock ownership. Dierences
in risk tolerance explain the higher rate of stock ownership among men, but wealth and
education remain important predictors of stock ownership even with the preference measure.
While risk tolerance has a signicant impact on stock ownership, the results also suggest a
role for non-preference sources of variation, such as transaction costs and risk perceptions. In
addition, this application demonstrates that a small set of hypothetical questions can capture
meaningful variation in preferences both across individuals and over time that applies to an
actual risky decision.
My analysis of the hypothetical income gambles contributes to a small empirical litera-
ture on the stability of risk preferences. The three comparable papers represent a range of
dierent types of choice data and time horizons. In an experiment with small-scale monetary
stakes, Harrison et al. (2005) nd that over a six month period there is no signicant shift
in the risk preferences of 31 subjects. My results  with a larger panel of 12,003 individuals
over a decade  also point to a substantial degree of temporal stability in risk preference.
In addition, the richness of the HRS allows me to examine how specic events might alter an
individual's risk preference. Unlike my results of relative stability in preferences, the analysis
by Post et al. (2006) of 84 contestants on the game show Deal or No Deal? nds that recent
events in the game strongly inuence a contestant's subsequent risk taking. Their nding of
path-dependent preferences agrees with other game shows studies, such as Gertner (1993),
and Thaler and Johnson's (1990) experiments with student subjects. In contrast, my study
shows that major life events, such as a job displacement or the diagnosis of a serious health
condition, do not permanently alter the willingness to take further risks. An individual's risk
tolerance is also unaected by changes in income and wealth even though lifetime income
is the explicit reference point in the gamble question. More similar to my results, Brunner-
meier and Nagel (2006) nd that transitory increases in wealth do not increase risk taking
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in household asset allocation. Their work ts in a large literature initiated by Friend and
Blume (1975) that uses actual asset allocation decisions to infer information on preferences.
But the portion of portfolio changes that reect an active decision by households is imper-
fectly observed and thus complicates the inference on risk preference. My analysis of the
hypothetical gambles  a very dierent type of data than actual portfolio choices  also
nds support for the utility specication of constant relative risk aversion. The diverse work
in this literature points to both a time-varying and a permanent component in risk taking.
The goal of my research is to empirically quantify the magnitude of these components and
investigate specic sources of variation.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2.2 discusses the hypothetical gambles in the
HRS. Section 2.3 uses expected utility theory to map the gamble responses to the coecient of
relative risk tolerance. The section then develops a statistical model of risk tolerance based on
the gamble responses. Section 2.4 presents the results from maximum-likelihood estimation
of the model. Section 2.5 uses the estimates of risk tolerance to study the household's actual
decision to own stocks. The nal section oers conclusions.
2.2 GAMBLES OVER LIFETIME INCOME
The Health and Retirement Study uses hypothetical gambles over lifetime income to elicit
risk attitudes. In a short series of questions, individuals choose between two jobs; one job
guarantees current lifetime income and the other job oers an unpredictable, but on average
higher lifetime income. In the 1992 HRS, individuals consider the following scenario:
Suppose that you are the only income earner in the family, and you have a good
job guaranteed to give you your current (family) income every year for life.
You are given the opportunity to take a new and equally good job, with a 50-
50 chance it will double your (family) income and a 50-50 chance that it will cut
your (family) income by a third. Would you take the new job?
Individuals who accept the rst risky job then consider a job with a larger downside risk of
one-half. Those who reject the rst risky job are asked about a job with a smaller downside
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risk of one-fth. Starting with the 1994 HRS, individuals who reject their rst two risky jobs
consider a third job that could cut their lifetime income by one-tenth. Likewise individuals
who accept their rst two risky jobs consider a third job that could cut their lifetime income
by three-quarters. I use these responses to order individuals in a small number of categories.
Table 2.1 relates the gamble response category to the downside risks that the individual
accepts and rejects. The category numbers are increasing in an individual's willingness to
accept income risk, so the gamble responses provide a coarse ranking of individuals by their
risk preference.
Barsky et al. (1997) designed the gambles and analyzed the responses on the rst two
waves of the HRS. They acknowledge the potential for a status quo bias in the gamble
responses due to the question wording, since individuals may have an aversion to a new
job unrelated to its income risk. The 1998 HRS revised the hypothetical scenario so that
individuals now choose between two new jobs:
Suppose that you are the only income earner in the family. Your doctor recom-
mends that you move because of allergies, and you have to choose between two
possible jobs.
The rst would guarantee your current total family income for life. The second is
possibly better paying, but the income is also less certain. There is a 50-50 chance
the second job would double your total lifetime income and a 50-50 chance that it
would cut it by a third. Which job would you take  the rst job or the second
job?
The objective attributes of the two jobs are identical in the original and revised versions of
the question. Furthermore the 1998, 2000, and 2002 HRS use the same sequence of downside
risks for the second job as the 1994 HRS uses for the new job. Over 30% of the individuals
respond to both versions of the question which allows me to estimate the size of the status
quo bias in the original question.
In this paper, I analyze 18,625 gamble responses on the 1992, 1994, 1998, 2000, and 2002
waves of the HRS from 12,003 individuals in the 1931 to 1947 birth cohorts.3 The panel is
3In 1992 the HRS has a representative sample of individuals age 51 to 61, that is, the 1931 to 1941 birth cohorts, plus
their spouses. The spouses are not necessarily representative of their birth cohort. The HRS periodically updates its sample
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unbalanced due to survey attrition, expansion of the survey in 1998, and targeted delivery
of the gamble questions in the survey. In particular, the survey usually asks the gambles to
new respondents and a random sub-sample of returning respondents. Nonetheless 45% of
the individuals answer the battery of income gambles in multiple waves and 8% answer the
gambles in three or more waves.
The distribution of gamble responses in Table 2.2 shows that most individuals are unwill-
ing to take income risks even when the expected value of the gamble is substantially larger
than their current lifetime income. In 1992, more than two-thirds of individuals reject the
risky job that oers a 50-50 chance to double lifetime income or cut it by one-fth. The
expected value of the income from this risky job is 140% of current lifetime income. And
less than 13% of individuals accept the risky job with a downside risk of one-half which
has an expected value of 125% of current lifetime income. The distribution of the gamble
response categories is fairly stable across waves, though individuals in 1998 are willing to
accept somewhat more income risk.
The placement of these gambles on a large panel study provides an ideal opportunity to
study systematic changes in risk tolerance, and the decade in which the gambles are elded
coincides with many signicant changes in individual circumstances and macroeconomic
conditions. Table 2.3 summarizes the primary set of individual attributes and events that I
use to quantify systematic changes in risk tolerance. First the considerable diversity in the
sample of gamble respondents in the HRS is worth noting. Of the 18,625 gamble responses,
43% are from men, 15% are from blacks, and 8% are from Hispanics.4 About one-fth of
the responses are from individuals with less than twelve years of education versus one-fth
from individuals with sixteen or more years of education.
to maintain a snapshot of Americans over age 50. Starting in 1998, the HRS has a representative sample of individuals in
the 1942 to 1947 birth cohorts that includes some of the spouses surveyed in earlier waves of the HRS. I use all of the survey
responses from individuals in the 1931 to 1947 cohorts across the rst six waves. I exclude the gamble responses of spouses
outside these birth cohorts, as well as the representative sample of individuals in the 1921 to 1929 cohorts, since they are mostly
retired at their initial survey and some express diculty with the job-related gambles. To insure that the gamble is dened
over non-trivial amounts of income, I also exclude individuals with total income less than $6,500 in 2002 dollars (or roughly
the fth percentile of income) at the time of their gamble responses or as an average across the six survey waves. The sample
selection criteria have qualitatively little eect on the results.
4The HRS over-samples blacks, Hispanics, and residents of Florida. The tabulations and estimation in the paper place equal
weight on each gamble respondent and do not reect the distribution of attributes in the population.
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Over the panel, several individuals have experiences that plausibly alter their expected
lifetime income. I focus particularly on job displacements and serious health conditions.
While an individual's past behavior may inuence the occurrence of these events, they are
not perfectly predictable and should represent some shock to an individual. Prior to their
gamble response, 25% of the respondents had experienced a job displacement, that is, a job
ending with a rm closure or layo, and 22% had received a diagnosis of heart disease, a
stroke, cancer, or lung disease. Most importantly, 13% of the gamble responses were followed
later in the survey by a rst job displacement for the individual and 17% by a rst diagnosis
of a serious health condition. This within-person variation is what allows me to identify
the direct eect of these events on an individual's risk tolerance. Table 2.3 also shows that
there are meaningful changes in income and wealth during the panel period.5 On average,
the household income and wealth of the respondents at the time of their gamble response
is below the average levels of their total income and wealth across the 1992 to 2002 survey
waves. But there is substantial variation across respondents in both the average level and
changes in income and wealth.
The gamble responses also coincides with signicant changes in the macroeconomy. Per-
formance of the U.S. stock market particularly dened the survey period of April 1992 to
February 2003. Figure 2.1 depicts the large increase and then sharp decline in the annual
real returns on the S&P 500 Index. The shaded areas on the gure denote months in which
the HRS asked the income gamble questions. The gambles appear on ve waves of the
HRS and each wave spans 8 to 15 months. This yields meaningful variation both across
and within survey waves. Figure 2.1 also highlights positive association between consumer
sentiment and stock market returns. I use the Index of Consumer Sentiment (ICS) in the
month of an individual's interview to measure the general economic condition at the time of
a gamble response.6 There is considerable variation in general economic outlook both across
5Wealth is the total household net worth including housing wealth and excluding pension and Social Security wealth. Income
is the total income of a respondent and spouse from all earnings, transfers, and other sources of income. Wealth and income
are from the RAND HRS data set and include imputed values.
6A description of the index is available at the Survey of Consumers (www.sca.isr.umich.edu). Howrey (2001) demonstrates
that the index has predictive power for economic recessions. Other indicators of the macroeconomic conditions, such as the
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and within survey waves. From October 1992 to February 2000 the index rose sharply from
70.3 to 111.3 and over the course of the 2002 HRS the index dropped sharply from 96.9 in
May 2002 to 79.9 in February 2003.
2.3 MODEL OF RISK TOLERANCE
In this section, I discuss how I use the gamble responses on the HRS to quantify changes
in an individual's risk tolerance over time, as well as dierences across individuals at a point
in time. I adopt the expected utility interpretation of the gambles and the general estimation
strategy developed by Barsky et al. (1997) and later used in Kimball et al. (2007). I use a rich
set of covariates to investigate systematic changes in risk tolerance. My model incorporates
the potential correlation between the time-constant component of risk tolerance and other
time-varying attributes. The estimates from a panel of gamble responses and attributes
allow me to determine whether a change in individual circumstances leads to a change in
risk tolerance or simply signals an individual's risk tolerance type.
2.3.1 Mapping Gambles to Preferences
Expected utility theory oers a translation of an individual's gamble responses to a stan-
dard metric of risk preference  the coecient of relative risk tolerance. Specically, choices
in the gambles establish a range for an individual's risk tolerance. Consider a general utility
function U and a level of permanent consumption c. Oered a 50-50 chance of doubling life-
time income or cutting it by a fraction π, an individual accepts a risky job when its expected
utility exceeds the utility from the certain job, that is, if
0.5U(2c) + 0.5U((1− π)c) ≥ U(c).(2.1)
The greater the curvature of U , the smaller the downside risk π an individual accepts. This
interpretation of the gamble responses links lifetime income to permanent consumption and
ignores the potential eect of wealth.7 To quantify risk preference, I assume that relative risk
unemployment rate or real return on the S&P 500 provide qualitatively similar results.
7As a sensitivity check, I model wealth explicitly in the argument of the utility function, such that c ∝ y + φw, where y
is the current total household income and w is 5% of total household net worth (or an approximate annuity value of wealth).
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The coecient of relative risk tolerance, θ = −U ′/cU ′′ (Pratt 1964), in this specication of
utility may dier across individuals. It is assumed to be constant for all values of permanent
consumption for a given individual. The estimated model of risk tolerance in Section 2.4,
which includes measures of income and wealth, is consistent with this assumption of constant
relative risk aversion utility.
In this framework, the gamble responses dene a range for an individual's risk tolerance θ.
Consider an individual, in gamble response category 3, who accepts the job with a one-fth
downside risk and rejects the job with a one-third downside risk. These choices imply a
coecient of relative risk tolerance between 0.27 and 0.50, since




















The highest downside risk accepted and the smallest risk rejected establish the upper and
lower bounds on risk tolerance. The last two columns of Table 2.1 provides the range of risk
tolerance for each of the gamble response categories.
2.3.2 Model of Measured Log Risk Tolerance
The statistical model of risk tolerance θit encompasses systematic changes in preferences
and a persistent attitude toward risk, such that,
log θit = xitβ + ai(2.5)
where xitβ is the time-varying component and ai is the time-constant component of the
logarithm of risk tolerance. The logarithmic specication of risk tolerance captures the fact
The estimated weight on wealth φ is 0.019 and is not statistically dierent from zero at the 5% level. Annuitization based on
a life table and the respondent's age has no qualitative eect on the estimated weight. Thus the simplifying assumption of
approximating consumption with income is appropriate when interpreting the gamble responses.
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that most individuals exhibit a low tolerance of risks in the gambles, but some individuals
are willing to take large income risks. The parameter β measures the percent change in risk
tolerance associated with a change in the attributes xit.
The time-constant component of risk tolerance ai may be correlated with the individual
circumstances xit that can change risk tolerance. For example, the experience of a job
displacement may reduce an individual's willingness to take further risks, that is, β < 0.
Or the event could primarily reveal an individual's risk tolerance type if more risk tolerant
individuals tend to select career paths with a higher risk of displacement. To accommodate
such selection eects, I model a relationship between the time-constant component ai and
observable attributes as
ai = xiλ + ui(2.6)
where xi is the panel average of xi1, ..., xiT for individual i and the type eect λ measures the
persistent systematic dierences across individuals in risk tolerance.8 The term ui captures
the portion of constant risk tolerance ai that is unrelated to the attributes in xi, a vector
that includes a constant. This mean-zero residual is constant for a given individual over
time and is independently distributed across individuals conditional on observables, such
that, ui|xi ∼ N(0, σ2u). The model of the correlated random eects in equation (2.6) follows
from Mundlak (1978). Chamberlain (1984) summarizes this modeling strategy and presents
a more general specication of the type eects.9
The estimation strategy also recognizes the limitations of using a small set of hypothetical
gambles responses to infer individual preferences. First, the gamble responses establish an
interval, not a point estimate, for risk tolerance, so I do not have the data to simply estimate
the linear model. Second, the income gamble questions likely generate substantial survey
8The panel is unbalanced, so the average is xi = (1/Ti
PT
j=1 witxit), where Ti is the number of survey waves for individual
i and wit is an indicator for participation in wave t. I include information on an individual's circumstances from the rst six
waves of the HRS, not just the waves in which an individual answers the income gambles. To make the estimated eects of an
event easier to interpret, I dene xit as an event prior to time t and xi as an event before the end of the panel.
9Specically, Chamberlain controls for the full set of an individual's covariates xi1, ..., xiT , not just the panel average, which
yields estimates of the type eects that can vary over time or λt. One limitation of the general specication is the need for a
balanced panel of the observables xit. This restriction would have reduced my sample of gamble respondents by 46%, so I use
the more parsimonious form of the correlated random eects with the panel average of observables.
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response error as is common with hypothetical and cognitively dicult questions. Nearly half
of the individuals switch their gamble responses across waves  one sign of random noise.
Comments made by individuals during the survey also highlight diculties respondents had
in answering the hypothetical income gamble questions.10 Survey response errors can arise on
the gambles when individuals misinterpret the hypothetical scenario or make computational
mistakes in their comparison of the jobs.
To incorporate these additional features of the data, I model the latent signal ξit from the
individual's gamble responses as a combination of risk tolerance θit and a survey response
error εit, such that
ξit = log θit + εit(2.7)
cit = j, if log θj < ξit < log θj (i = 1, ..., N ; t = 1, ...T )(2.8)
where cit is the gamble response category that is observed in the data. An individual in
response category j has a noisy signal of risk tolerance that lies in the interval (log θj, log θj),
where the cutos are the logarithm of the values in Table 2.1. The odds and outcomes are
explicit in the gamble questions, so with the assumption of constant relative risk aversion
utility, the intervals of risk tolerance are known values and do not vary across individuals
or across waves. The model of the latent signal incorporates two sources of variation in the
gamble responses over time: systematic changes in risk tolerance and survey response error.
Earlier studies of the income gambles by Barsky et al. (1997) and Kimball et al. (2007) on the
HRS also model the time variation in gamble responses due to response error. My analysis
is the rst to investigate changes in risk tolerance that are both systematically associated
with observed changes in circumstances and due to the random variation from response
errors. For identication, I assign all the changes in the latent signal that are unrelated to
these covariates to the survey response error. This assumption likely understates any high
10Examples from the 1998 HRS interviewer records include: I'd take the one with more money, It's too hard for me over the
phone, and I don't have experience. Anything without experience I can't answer. The interviewer records comments made
by the respondent at each question. In the 1998 HRS, there were comments to the gambles from less than 8% of individuals
and many entries only noted a repetition of the question. This para-data is restricted access and its availability varies across
waves. For further information contact hrsquest@isr.umich.edu.
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frequency shifts in risk tolerance. My focus on the time-constant and systematic variation in
preferences is consistent a well-dened measure of risk preference that would apply to other
risky decisions made by the individual.
In modeling the survey response error, I also investigate the question framing eects and
heteroscedasticity in the response error. The survey response error εit has the form
εit = qitδ + eit(2.9)
where qit is an indicator for a gamble response to the original (new job) version of the ques-
tion, so δ measures the degree of status quo bias in responses to the gamble question on the
1992 and 1994 HRS.11 The term eit is a survey response error that is unrelated to both the
question type and other observables. It is independently distributed N(0, σ2eit) across indi-
viduals and over time. I allow the observed attributes in the model of risk tolerance and the
question type to also aect the dispersion of the response error. Specically, the dispersion
in response errors is σeit = exp[(xit, xi, qit)σe], where σe is a parameter vector that relates
individual attributes to the variation in response errors. Thus individuals with a particular
attribute, such as less education, do not systematically understate (or overstate) their risk
tolerance in their gamble responses. The response errors in this group, however, may be
larger in absolute value than the response errors from individuals with more education. The
term eit soaks up changes in an individual's gamble responses that are not associated with the
observed attributes, as well as the unsystematic transitory variation in the gamble responses
across individuals. The heteroscedastic variance of eit permits the precision in the gamble
responses  or the degree of wave-to-wave switches  to vary with individual attributes
and question type. The gambles are complicated hypothetical questions on a lengthy survey
and answers to the gambles have no real consequences, so a careful treatment of the survey
response error is essential to infer risk tolerance from the gamble responses.12
11Features of the gamble delivery, such as a face-to-face or a telephone interview, or dierences in respondent's survey behavior,
such as time to complete the interview and frequency of item non-response, could also be included in qit. For covariates that
systematically aect both preferences and response errors, it would not be possible to separately estimate β and δ.
12Previous research also nds that the use of hypothetical questions leads to more variance in responses  not a systematic
bias in the responses. In their survey of experimental studies, Camerer and Hogarth (1999) nd that the size of nancial
incentives does not aect the average performance on judgment tasks. But smaller nancial incentives are associated with
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Combining the models of risk tolerance and survey response error yields a reduced-form
description of the latent signal in the gamble responses:
ξit = xitβ + ai + qitδ + eit(2.10)
= xitβ + xiλ + qitδ + ui + eit(2.11)
A restatement of the model draws particular attention to the variation in the preference
signal within and between individuals. Specically,
ξit = (xit − xi)β + xi(λ + β) + qitδ + ui + eit(2.12)
where the rst term (xit−xi)β captures a change in risk tolerance for a given individual and
the second term xi(λ + β) captures the dierences in risk tolerance across individuals that
are associated with observed attributes. The separate identication of the direct eect β and
the type eect λ depends crucially on variation in xit over the panel period and variation in
xi across the individuals. For time-constant attributes, such as gender and race, or choices
made before the survey period, such as years of education, I can only identify the composite
term of (β + λ), not the direct eect β. In contrast, the type eect λ of a covariate is not
identied when its panel average xi is the same for all individuals. For example, the gamble
respondents all experienced the same macroeconomy of the 1990s, so any association between
the average economic outlook in the panel and the persistent component of risk tolerance is
absorbed in the estimate of the constant.
2.3.3 Log-Likelihood of Gamble Responses
I use maximum-likelihood methods to estimate the parameters (β, λ, δ, σu, σe) of the
reduced-form model in equation (2.11) with the panel of income gamble responses and co-
variates. I compute the probability of observing an individual's set of gamble responses over
the survey period with a truncated normal distribution function, where the order of the
function corresponds to the number of waves (up to ve) in which an individual answers the
greater variance or noise in the responses. Similarly Dohmen et al. (2006) establish a strong but imperfect correlation between
the responses to hypothetical gambles on a large survey and gambles in an experiment with actual payos.
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income gambles. Consider, for example, an individual who answers the gambles in only one
wave of the HRS, but participates in multiple waves of the survey. The attributes xit that
are observed with a response to version qit of the income gambles and the average of these
attributes across the entire panel xi yield the following likelihood that the individual is in
gamble response category j at time t:
P(cit = j|xit, xi, qit) = P(log θj < ξit < log θj|xit, xi, qit)
= Φ
(









where σ2ξit = Var(ξit|xit, xi, qit) = σ2u + σ2eit and Φ(·) is the univariate normal cumulative
distribution function. I adjust the likelihood function accordingly for the individuals who
answer the gamble questions in multiple survey waves.13 Since the lower bound log θ and
upper bound log θ for the latent signal in each response category are known, the mean eects
of β, λ, and δ are identied separately from the variance terms and are interpretable as if
the latent signal ξit were directly observed.14 Given the model of preferences, the estimate
of β is the percent change in risk tolerance for a given individual due to a change in xit and
λ is the percent dierence in risk tolerance across individuals due to a dierence in xi.
The maximum-likelihood estimator nds the values of the parameters that maximize the
conditional log-likelihood L of the sample:





1[ci = j] logP(ci = j|xit, xi, qit)(2.14)
where ci = (ci1, ...ciT ) is the set of an individual's gamble responses on the HRS and J con-
tains all possible sets of response categories. For the estimator, I use the modied method of
scoring, a Newton-Raphson algorithm in which the sample average of the outer product from
the score function approximates the information matrix.15 The estimates of the asymptotic
13The individual-specic random eect ui is constant over time, such that the Cov(ξis, ξit|xis, xit, xi, qis, qit) = σ2u for s 6= t.
To simplify the computation of the higher order probabilities, I integrate the product of the univariate densities conditional
on ui over the distribution of ui. See Cameron and Trivedi (2005) for a further discussion of this standard method. For the
integration, I use Matlab codes for Gaussian quadrature from Miranda and Fackler (2002). I use correlated random eects
for the probit model of gamble responses, since there is no consistent xed-eects estimator, see Chamberlain (1984) for a
discussion.
14In contrast, a standard ordered probit model also estimates the cutos, so only the ratio of the mean eects to the unobserved
standard deviation is identied. Even with known cutos, the identication of σu and σe requires that at least some individuals
respond to the gambles in more than one wave.
15I calculate the score with numerical dierentiation code from Miranda and Fackler (2002) and implement the maximum-
likelihood estimator in Matlab.
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standard errors are also derived from this estimator of the information matrix.
2.4 ESTIMATES OF RISK TOLERANCE
The results from the maximum-likelihood estimation reveal a low degree of risk tolerance
on average, although there is considerable preference heterogeneity across individuals. The
mean of relative risk aversion in the sample is 9.6 and its standard deviation is also 9.6.16
This implies that an average respondent would be willing to pay 28% of lifetime income to
avoid a gamble with the 50-50 chance of doubling lifetime income or cutting it by one-third.
It is possible that some feature in the framing, elding, or modeling of the gambles may
bias the estimated level of risk preference. Yet even with a persistent misstatement in the
gamble responses, this panel of answers to the same question over a decade still provides
valid information on the stability of individuals' preferences.
In this sample of older individuals, the gamble responses reveal few sources of systematic
and long-lasting shifts in risk tolerance. I nd a moderate decline in risk tolerance with
age and a co-movement of individual risk tolerance and the macroeconomic conditions. But
changes in the individual's total household income or wealth do not signicantly alter an
individual's willingness to take risk. In addition, a job displacement and diagnosis of a
serious health condition, two personal events that plausibly reduce expected lifetime income,
have little impact on risk tolerance. These results support the standard utility specication
of constant relative risk aversion for within-person changes in consumption. I also nd large
stable dierences across individuals in risk tolerance type that relate to commonly observed
attributes. The estimated eects of time-constant observed attributes, such as gender and
race, broadly conform to the results in earlier cross-sectional studies of risk attitudes. The
panel structure of the HRS also reveals a relationship between individuals' earlier decisions,
such as career choice, and their risk tolerance type. The rest of this section discusses the
results from the maximum-likelihood estimation. The full model has 55 parameters, including
16See Kimball et al. (2007) for more details on the distribution of risk preference estimated with a similar sample of HRS
gamble responses.
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direct eects, type eects, and error variance eects related to 20 observed attributes, so I
have chosen to present the results in pieces. Appendix Table 2.9 contains the full set of
covariates and estimates.
2.4.1 Household Income and Wealth
The outcomes in the hypothetical gambles are dened as fractions of your current family
income every year for life, so the changes in income that individuals experience over the
panel of gamble responses provide the power to test the utility specication of constant
relative risk aversion. The gamble responses reveal no discernible change in risk tolerance
when an individual's current income or wealth deviates from its average level in the panel.17
The rst column of Table 2.4 shows that a 10% increase in current income relative to the
individual's average income is associated with only a 0.3% increase in risk tolerance. With a
standard error of 0.3% the direct eect of a within-person change in income on risk tolerance
is a precisely estimated zero eect. Likewise changes in an individual's current wealth have
no discernible eect on risk tolerance. These results suggest that the assumption of constant
relative risk aversion as consumption changes for a particular individual is justiable.18
The gamble responses, however, do not imply that risk aversion is constant across indi-
viduals with dierent levels of consumption. There are modest and statistically signicant
dierences in risk tolerance across individuals related to their level of average income and
average wealth in the panel. A 10% higher level of average income is associated with a
0.9% higher relative risk tolerance  a pattern consistent with more risk tolerant individuals
selecting higher risk, higher return sources of income. This eect is modest in size but is sta-
17The net value of total household wealth is the sum of all wealth minus all debts. Wealth components include value of
primary residence, net value of other real estate, net value of vehicles, net value of businesses, and net value of nancial assets
(IRAs, stocks, CDs, bonds, cash, and other assets). Debts include value of all mortgages, value of other home loans, and value
of other debts. Total household income includes earnings, employer pensions, Supplemental Security Income, Social Security
disability and retirement, unemployment and workers compensation, and other government transfers for the husband and wife
plus household capital income and other income. This analysis uses RAND HRS (Version F) data and imputations for wealth
and income.
18The absence of an eect from changes in wealth could either signal a non-integration of wealth in the evaluation of the
income gamble or provide support for CRRA. The hypothetical nature of the question may also play a role in the results. In an
experimental study with actual and hypothetical stakes, Holt and Laury (2002) nd that changes in the magnitude of the stakes
lead to changes in an individual risk aversion only when the stakes are real, but not when they are hypothetical. The largest
possible payo to a single gamble in their experiment is $346.50 and the largest change is the payos across their treatments is
$342.65. In contrast, the stakes in the HRS gambles are dened over lifetime income where the median level of current income
is $54,176 and the median deviation in current income from average income is $2,167. The large dierence in the scale of the
risks between their study and mine complicates a direct comparison of the results.
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tistically dierent from zero at the 5% level. Similarly, individuals with greater indebtedness
reveal a higher level of risk tolerance in their gamble responses, with a 10% more negative
average wealth associated with a 0.5% higher relative risk tolerance. There is no discernible
pattern in risk tolerance across individuals with dierent, positive levels of average wealth.
This could result from a cancelling of two eects: less risk tolerant individuals accumulate
precautionary saving and more risk tolerant individuals select riskier, higher return assets.
These results from the HRS are comparable to previous cross-sectional studies of hypo-
thetical choice data that nd an association between the willingness to take risk and the level
of income and wealth, including Donkers et al. (2001) and Dohmen et al. (2006). With dif-
ferent survey questions and modelling approaches in their cross-section studies, their point
estimates are not directly comparable to my results. In general, the association between
risk preferences and income or wealth in all of these studies is consistently small relative to
demographics, such as gender and age.19
The second column of Table 2.4 investigates the robustness of the baseline estimates of
income and wealth eects. The question frame of a hypothetical job choice may impede
non-workers from revealing their true preferences and obscure an eect of income or wealth
on risk tolerance. This issue could be particularly severe in the HRS where one-third of the
individuals are not working at the time of their gamble response and over 40% experience a
change in their work status during the panel. The estimates in the second column of Table
2.4 demonstrate that the risk tolerance of working household heads is no more sensitive to
changes in income or wealth than the risk tolerance of all respondents. The direct eects of
income and wealth in this sub-sample are not substantially altered and remain statistically
indistinguishable from zero at the 5% level. The positive association between the logarithm
of average income and risk tolerance does increases to 0.14 from 0.09. The type eect of
negative wealth decreases to 0.01 from 0.05 and is no longer distinguishable from zero.
19In their index of risk aversion, Donkers et al. (2001) nd that being 10 years younger has the same marginal eect as having
81% more income. On a qualitative general risk question and a hypothetical lottery question, Dohmen et al. (2006) nd even
smaller marginal eects, such that a one year dierence in age is equivalent to more than a 75% dierence in income or wealth.
By my estimates, the decline in risk tolerance from a one year increase in age is equivalent to the decline in risk tolerance from
current income 59% below average income or current wealth 49% below average wealth.
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2.4.2 Job Displacement and Health Condition
I also examine the association between risk tolerance and two major life events, a job dis-
placement and a serious health condition, that likely aect an individual's expected lifetime
income.20 The gambles on the HRS are dened over current lifetime income, so a shift in this
reference point could alter an individual's attitude toward risk. For example, individuals may
accept more income risk after a negative personal shock if that gamble could restore their
original level of lifetime income. Or individuals who have received one draw of bad luck may
simply be less willing to spin the wheel again.21 Rather than a change in risk tolerance,
these events  which do not occur purely at random  could also signal an individual's
risk tolerance type. For example, high risk tolerant types may have selected riskier career
paths with a higher chance of displacement, so they comprise a large fraction of the workers
who actually experience displacements. Or more risk tolerant individuals may have forgone
preventative health care, and thus accepted a higher risk of a serious health condition. A
panel of gamble responses and events is essential for separating these mechanisms.
In Table 2.5 both a job displacement and the onset of a health condition are associated
with a decline in risk tolerance of 6% and 9% respectively. These direct eects are imprecisely
estimated and not statistically dierent from zero at the 5% level.22 More striking is the
evidence of selection into risky careers based on individual preferences. Among individuals
with no prior job displacement at the time of their gamble response, those who will experi-
ence a displacement later in the panel are 19% more risk tolerant than those who will never
experience a displacement. The estimate of the type eect is both economically and statis-
tically signicant, as it suggests that high risk tolerance types have systematically chosen
riskier careers with a higher chance of displacement. The positive correlation between risk
tolerance and income risk underscores the need for a direct measure of individual preferences.
20Several studies nd that a job displacement lowers current and future earnings (Ruhm 1991), as well as reduces long-run
consumption (Stephens 2001). Likewise Smith (2003) nds that a severe health event aects household income and wealth.
21Alternatively, a decrease in an individual's risk tolerance following a negative income shock could also follow from a model
of internal habit formation.
22I dene a job displacement as a job ending with a business closure or a layo. The HRS provides information on up to two
jobs prior to the initial interview, the job at each interview, and jobs between interviews. I dene a serious health condition as
heart disease, stroke, cancer, or lung disease. The HRS asks separately about these and other conditions.
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For example, studies of household wealth accumulation that do not address this systematic
variation in preferences would underestimate the amount of precautionary savings.23 The
estimated type eect of a serious health condition is only 2% and is not statistically dierent
from zero at the 5% level.
I use the gamble responses that individuals provide before and after major life events
to identify the impact of these events on risk tolerance. In an unbalanced panel, attrition
could be systematically related to these events and thus to changes in risk tolerance. The
second column of Table 2.5 presents the results from the model estimated with individuals
who respond in all six waves of the HRS.24 The balanced panel produces similar estimates
of the type eects, but dierent estimates of the direct eects. The estimated direct eects
imply a larger declines in risk tolerance of 11% after a job displacement and of 15% after
the onset of a health condition. The direct eect of a health condition is now statistically
signicant. The bottom panel of Table 2.5 shows that the estimated type eects in the
unbalanced and balanced panels are similar. In the balanced panel, individuals who will
experience a job displacement later in the panel are 20% more risk tolerant and those who
will experience the onset of a health condition are 6% more risk tolerant than individuals who
will not experience the event before the end of the panel. As in the unbalanced panel, the
across-person dierence in risk tolerance that is revealed by a job displacement is statistically
signicant.
2.4.3 Age, Cohort, and Time
The ten-year panel of gamble responses also provides a unique opportunity to examine
systematic changes in risk tolerance with age and with changes in the macroeconomic con-
ditions. Yet, even with multiple observations from the same individuals, I face the standard
challenge of separating the eects of age, birth cohort and time.25 I model the time eects
23In a comparison of savings in the former East and West Germany after reunication, Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln (2005)
also nd evidence of job selection due to risk preferences. They also show that ignoring this selection would underestimate
precautionary wealth by 40% among German households.
24Note that this is a balanced panel of information on job displacements, health conditions, and other demographics, but not
on the income gambles. The income gambles are only asked in ve of the six survey waves and not to all respondents.
25Age, birth cohort, and time form a perfect relationship, that is, age = year − birth year, so the separation of the eects
requires further assumptions. See Hall et al. (2005) for a discussion of various identication strategies and other references.
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with a measure of macroeconomic conditions at the time of the gamble response. I use a
linear specication for the age eects and indicator variables that span ve to six birth years
for the cohort eects. The rst column of Table 2.6 presents the estimates of the model.
I nd that each year of age is associated with a 1.7% decline in an individual's risk toler-
ance. This implies almost a 20% decrease in risk tolerance over the survey period associated
with aging.26 Individuals in the 1937-41 birth cohorts are also 16% more risk tolerant than
individuals in the 1931-1936 cohorts. The eects of birth cohort are suggestive of individ-
uals closer to the Great Depression being less willing to take risk. Finally there is a strong
positive relationship between risk tolerance and macroeconomic conditions, as measured by
the Index of Consumer Sentiment (ICS) in the month of the gamble response. A ten-point
increase in the sentiment index is associated with a 9% increase in an risk tolerance. During
the panel period, there are substantial movements in this measure of economic conditions
which imply quantitatively important changes in average risk tolerance. For example, risk
tolerance increased steadily by 36% from October 1992 to February 2000 and then decreased
sharply by 15% from May 2002 to February 2003. The movements in risk tolerance over the
business cycle are substantial in magnitude; however, they do not signal a permanent shift
in an individual's risk tolerance. To explore the duration of the macroeconomic eects, the
second column of Table 2.6 adds a measure of consumer sentiment at six months and one
year prior to the gamble response. The strongest association of 0.006 (t-statistic of 2.2) is
between current macroeconomic conditions and risk tolerance. The estimated eect declines
to 0.004 (t-statistic of 1.6)and -0.001 (t-statistic of -0.4) for macroeconomic conditions at six
months and one year prior to the gamble response respectively. These results suggest the
eect of changes in the macroeconomic conditions on risk tolerance is short-lived.
Sample attrition that is related to an individual's risk tolerance, such as engaging in risky health behaviors that raise the chance
of death, could also bias the estimates.
26In comments during the gamble sequences, some individuals explicitly recognize the eect of aging on risk tolerance:
Depends on how old you are. If you are 25, you gamble, but not now. and If I were younger, I would take a chance. Other
studies, including Barsky et al. (1997), Donkers et al. (2001), and Dohmen et al. (2006), also nd that older individuals are
less willing to take risks. But my analysis is the rst to use within person variation in gamble responses to identify the eect
of aging. Even though this analysis uses a rich set of covariates, there are several events that are correlated with aging and are
not included in this model of risk tolerance. The current results show an negative association, but not a causal link, between
aging and risk tolerance.
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The last two columns of Table 2.6 use an alternate specication of the year eects that
includes indicator variables for the survey wave. In the third column, the model controls
for the survey wave of a gamble response, but not for consumer sentiment.27 All of the
year eects are economically and statistically signicant. This alternate specication has
only a modest impact on the point estimate for age and birth cohort. In the last column,
the model includes both the indicators of the survey wave and the measure of consumer
sentiment. Here the eect of macroeconomic conditions is identied entirely from within-
wave variation. Nonetheless the estimate of 0.007 is only 17% lower than the estimate of
0.009 in the baseline model and is still statistically dierent from zero at the 5% level. In
addition, the Index of Consumer Sentiment soaks up much the wave-to-wave dierences in
gamble responses. Only in the 1994 HRS do the gamble respondents remain signicantly
more risk tolerant than the gamble respondents in the 1992 HRS.28 Again the estimated
eects of age and birth cohort are not altered by dierent specication of the time eects.
The comparison of the results in Table 2.6 demonstrates that my parsimonious model of
age, cohort, and time in the rst column captures the systematic change in individuals' risk
tolerance with age and macroeconomic conditions.
2.4.4 Individual Attributes
While there are modest changes in risk tolerance, 73% of the systematic variation in
preferences is driven by the time-constant dierences across individuals. The estimates in
the rst column of Table 2.7 reveal substantial dierences in risk tolerance by gender, race,
and years of education. The relative risk tolerance of men is 14% higher than of women 
a nding consistent with a vast literature on gender dierences in risk taking; see Byrnes et
al. (1999) for a meta-analysis of the studies in psychology. There is an even larger disparity
in the willingness to take risk by race with blacks 28% less risk tolerant than whites. The
27In addition, I cannot control separately for the question version, since all the gamble respondents in the 1992 HRS and
1994 HRS answer the new job version of the question.
28The gambles on the 1994 HRS are asked in a module at the end of the survey. In the four other waves, the gambles appear
near the end of the Cognition or Expectations Section of the core survey. This section is generally in the middle-end of the
survey. Individuals are randomly selected to participate in the module in 1994, and they are explicitly given an opportunity to
skip this extra section. The group of gamble respondents  and the environment of the question collection  in 1994 may not
be entirely comparable to gamble responses on other waves.
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income gambles on the HRS also reveal a strong positive association between education and
risk tolerance, such that those with more than post-graduate education are 32% more risk
tolerant than high school graduates. Other work that analyzes hypothetical risky choices
and qualitative measures of risk taking on large-scale surveys, such as Dohmen et al. (2006)
and Donkers et al. (2001), has found similar patterns for all three variables. My analysis is
one of the few attempts to quantify these dierences in terms of the coecient of relative
risk tolerance.29
Table 2.7 also provides the estimated eects of marital status on risk tolerance. Entering
a marriage is associated with an 11% increase in risk tolerance, though the estimate is not
statistically dierent from zero at the 5% level. Yet less risk tolerant individuals are more
likely to be consistently married in the panel. All else equal, an individual who is married
at each survey is 16% less risk tolerant than an individual who is never married and the
selection eect is statistically signicant.30 Again this pattern is consistent with a stable
attitude toward risk that inuences actual behavior.
Finally there is a strong relationship between the measures of risk tolerance and prob-
abilistic thinking skills in the HRS. Individuals who provide more precise answers to the
subjective probability questions in the survey are also willing to take more risk on the hypo-
thetical income gambles and exhibit less random variation in their gamble responses across
survey waves. In my model of risk tolerance, I use the measure of probability precision
developed by Lillard and Willis (2001), that is, the fraction of the subjective probability
questions to which the individual provides an exact answer (not 0, 50, 100). There are
roughly 20 such questions in each survey wave that cover future personal and general events.
On average respondents only give exact answers to about 40% of the probability questions.
Lillard and Willis (2001) use a model of uncertainty aversion to argue that individuals with
29In their study of the income gambles on the HRS, Barsky et al. (1997) compare their measure of an individual's risk
tolerance  estimated from only the gamble responses  across several groups. Their ndings are qualitatively similar to
mine. In contrast to their univariate comparisons, my analysis of risk tolerance uses a multivariate maximum-likelihood model
and a richer set of covariates.
30This calculation adds the estimated direct eect of 11% with the type eect of -27%. The comment data also provide
evidence of how a family mitigates the desire to take risks, such as If just I, gamble, but for family go with the rst.
25
less precise probability beliefs should be less willing to take risk.31 The results in Table 2.7
are consistent with their hypothesis, such that a one-standard deviation higher average FEP
is associated with a 20% higher level of risk tolerance.32 An increase in current FEP relative
to the individual's panel average FEP is also associated with a substantial increase in risk
tolerance.
This paper focuses on within-person changes and across-person dierences in risk tolerance
that are systematically related to other observed attributes. Yet, the gamble responses
also imply a large amount of residual variation. The model of risk tolerance allows for
an individual-specic, time-constant component of risk tolerance that is uncorrelated with
the observables. In Table 2.7 the estimated standard deviation of this random individual
eect is 0.72 which is large both in absolute terms and relative to the other estimated mean
eects. As a comparison, the standard deviation of log risk tolerance that is systematically
associated with the rich set of covariates is 0.41. There is even more transitory variation in
the gamble responses that is unrelated to the observables. The estimated standard deviation
of the response errors is 1.55 and is more than twice the standard deviation of the individual
eect. The magnitude of these residuals highlights the scope for further investigation of
time-constant survey response errors and transitory preference shocks.
As the rst two columns of Table 2.7 reveal, the modelling of the response error variance
aects the estimates of risk tolerance. The baseline model in the rst column allows the esti-
mated standard deviation of the transitory response errors to vary with the model covariates.
The model in the second column instead imposes homoscedasticity. While the qualitative
patterns in risk tolerance are largely the same, in many cases, the point estimates on the
direct and type eects dier substantial across the two models of response error variance.
For example, the standard deviation of men's response error is 12% larger than women's
31A common survey response strategy on subjective questions could provide an alternate source of covariation between an
individual's gamble and probability responses. To minimize survey time and eort, some individuals may choose the easy
answer to both questions, that is, 0-50-100 on the probabilities and reject the risky (and computationally intensive) job on the
gambles.
32Kézdi and Willis (2006) also establish a positive association between actual stock ownership and more precise probability
beliefs. The statistical model of risk tolerance that I estimate is observationally equivalent to uncertainty aversion model of
Lillard and Willis (2001), but I do not explicitly test their mechanism.
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response error, so in the homoscedastic model, the estimated dierence in risk tolerance by
gender increases to 22% from 14% in the heteroscedastic model.33 These shifts in the point
estimates also reect the nonlinearity of the maximum-likelihood model.
2.4.5 Measure of Individual Risk Tolerance
The model estimates can also be used to form a proxy for an individual's risk tolerance
at a particular point in time. Specically, I calculate the expected value of log risk tolerance
conditional on the individual's observed attributes xit and xi and gamble responses ci in the
panel, such that,
E(log θit|xit, xi, ci) = xitβ + xiλ + E(ui|xit, xi, cit, ...ciT ) .(2.15)
The mean of the random eect ui conditional on attributes xi is zero, yet an individual's set
of gamble responses ci = (cit, ...ciT ) does provide some information on the expected level of
this component.34
The decomposition of the preference measure into permanent and transitory components
is again useful with
E(log θit|xit, xi, ci) = (xit − xi)β + xi(β + λ) + E(ui|xit, xi, ci)(2.16)
where the rst term on the right is a transitory component related to changes in the observed
attributes of an individual, the second term is a permanent component related to dierences
across individuals in their observed attributes, and the third term is a permanent component
related only to the dierence across individuals in their gamble responses. The variance of
the systematic within-person changes in risk tolerance (the rst term) accounts for only
11% of the total variance in the individual measure of risk tolerance, whereas the variance
of the systematic across-person dierences (the second term) accounts for 45% of the total
variance. Both changes in risk tolerance over time and dierences in risk tolerance across
33The estimated eects of age and income, not reported here, are also greatly aected by the error variance assumptions.
The homoscedastic model estimates a 47% smaller decrease in risk tolerance with age than the baseline model (a direct eect of
-1.2% under versus -1.7%). The dierence in risk tolerance associated with dierences in average income is 50% smaller (0.06%
versus 0.09%) and no longer statistically dierent from zero.
34The variance of the conditional expectation of log θit is much smaller than its unconditional variance. See Kimball et al.
(2007) for a further discussion of how this diminished variability impacts the use of a proxy based on the conditional expectation.
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individuals contribute to the systematic heterogeneity in measured preferences, though the
stable dierences across individuals are empirically more important. A substantial portion
of the between-person variation in the risk tolerance proxy is not related to the observables
in the model.
2.5 STOCK OWNERSHIP
The primary reason to study preferences is to better understand behavior, so in this
section I use the individual measure of risk tolerance from the gamble responses to analyze
the considerable dierences in stock ownership across households over the 1990s. As economic
theory predicts, there is a strong positive association between the measure of risk tolerance
and the holding of risky nancial assets. A transitory increase in risk tolerance, as well
as a persistently higher level of risk tolerance both raise the marginal probability of actual
stock ownership. The measure of risk tolerance also renes the common inference on other
determinants of stock ownership, including the eects of gender, education, and wealth.
Finally this analysis of stock ownership highlights the usefulness and validity of the risk
tolerance proxy.
To study stock ownership, I follow the nancial respondents from the original HRS house-
holds over the rst six waves from 1992 to 2002. The nancial respondent is the individual
who is most knowledgeable about the nances of the household and who reports on the
income and wealth in the survey. In my analysis of stock ownership, I exclude nancial re-
spondents who are in households with no nancial assets, negative net worth, or no income
at any of the six survey waves. This yields a balanced panel of 2,464 nancial respondents
with 14,784 household-wave observations.35 In the pooled sample, 46% of the nancial re-
spondents own stocks directly.36 The cross-sectional rate of stock ownership varies in the
panel period. Stock ownership increases from 41% of households in the 1992 HRS to 47% of
35I follow a nancial respondent even if his or her original household dissolves. This structure to the data reects the fact
that I measure risk tolerance at the individual level, but assets are typically held jointly in the household. At any wave, there
is only one member of each household in my sample.
36The denition of stocks includes nancial assets in corporate stocks, mutual funds, or investment funds and excludes stocks
held indirectly in IRAs or DC-pensions.
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households in the 2000 HRS and then decreases slightly to 45% in the 2002 HRS. Following
the same respondents over the panel, 28% never hold stocks, 20% always hold stocks, and
52% change ownership status at least once.
The rst column of Table 2.8 presents the estimated marginal eects on the probability
of owning stocks for a subset of the model covariates.37 The results in the rst column are
similar to the results in numerous studies of household portfolios, for examples, see Guiso
et al. (2002). Men are 3 percentage points more likely to own stocks than women, though
the eect is not precisely estimated. Higher levels of education and wealth are particularly
strong predictors of stock ownership. College graduates are 19 percentage points more likely
to own stocks than high school graduates. A 10% higher average wealth across individuals
is associated with a 2.9 percentage point higher probability of stock ownership, and a 10%
increase in wealth for a particular individual increases the probability of stock ownership by
1.4 percentage points.
The results in the second column of Table 2.8 show how a direct measure of risk tolerance
renes the inferences on stock ownership. This model adds two measures of individual's risk
tolerance: the average of log risk tolerance across the six survey waves and the deviation
between current log risk tolerance and the panel average level. As economic theory predicts,
both measures of risk tolerance are positively associated with stock ownership.38 A 10%
higher level of average risk tolerance across individuals is associated with a 1.0 percentage
point higher probability of stock ownership. And a 10% increase in an individual's risk
tolerance raises the probability of stock ownership by 0.9 percentage points. Both of these
eects are statistically and economically signicant.39 The model of risk tolerance estimated
in Section 2.4 reveals considerable heterogeneity, so a one-standard dierence in risk toler-
37The correlated random eects probit of stock ownership estimated in Stata includes all the covariates from the model of
risk tolerance (see Appendix Table 2.9), except for the fraction of exact probability responses, job displacements and health
conditions, and adds indicator variables for the survey waves. The key exclusion restriction is that FEP does not aect
stockholding directly. Its eect on stock ownership is mediated through risk tolerance. The marginal eects are computed at
the sample median of the variables with the random eect set to zero.
38Other measures of stock ownership, such as the dollar value of stock holding and the share of nancial assets held in stocks,
produce qualitatively similar results. My results in the panel are consistent with the results of Barsky et al. (1997) in the
cross-section.
39The asymptotic standard errors in the second column Table 2.8 do not account for the sampling variation in the risk
tolerance measures which are generated from the rst-step maximum-likelihood estimates. Bootstrap replications on a related,
but computationally less intensive model in Kimball et al. (2007) yield only modest increases in the standard errors.
29
ance corresponds to a 8.2 percentage point dierence in the predicted probability of stock
ownership  almost one-fth of the actual ownership rate.
The measure of risk tolerance also renes the association between stock ownership and
the other covariates. For example, the variation in risk tolerance absorbs much of the higher
probability of stock ownership among men that is estimated in the rst model. Likewise
the eect of education on stock ownership is partially reduced when the model includes a
measure of risk tolerance. Specically, the estimated marginal eects of a college education
and post-graduate education drop by 17% and 35% respectively. These results suggest that
dierences in risk preference can account for some of the commonly observed association
between education and stock ownership. In contrast, Table 2.8 shows that the marginal
eect of wealth on stock ownership is unrelated to dierences in risk preference. Alternate
explanations, such as transaction costs, are needed to explain the strong association between
wealth and stock ownership, since there is no evidence of decreasing relative risk aversion. A
direct measure of risk tolerance provides an opportunity to explore the mechanisms behind
the large dierences in stock ownership across households and over time. The strong asso-
ciation between the measure of risk tolerance and actual stock ownership also demonstrates
that the hypothetical gambles capture meaningful dierences in preferences.
2.6 CONCLUSION
Risk tolerance diers systematically both across individuals and over time. Most of these
dierences stem from characteristics, such as gender and ethnicity, that are constant over
time for a particular individual; however, there are some sources of systematic change in an
individual's risk tolerance, such as aging and changes in macroeconomic conditions. Other
changes in individual circumstances, including the loss of a job or the end of a marriage,
reveal information about individuals' risk tolerance type, not a change in their willingness
to take risk.
The fact that risk tolerance diers greatly across individuals but is relatively stable for
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a particular individual has important consequences for studying risky behavior. The large
dierences in risk preference across individuals underscore the need for a survey measure of
these dierences. The relative stability of preferences and the correspondence between this
survey measure of risk tolerance and actual risky behavior support our ability to measure
risk preference at the individual level. Yet, the apparent noisiness of the hypothetical gamble
responses needs to be further explored with higher frequency data and other survey questions,
since the survey response error may be absorbing short-lived, but behaviorally important
preference shocks. Nonetheless, it is clear that economic studies of behavior need to take into
account the stable component of risk preference that diers systematically across individuals.
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Table 2.1: Risk Tolerance Response Categories
Downside Risk Bounds on
Response of Risky Job Risk Tolerance
Category Accepted Rejected Lower Upper
1 None 1/10 0 0.13
2 1/10 1/5 0.13 0.27
3 1/5 1/3 0.27 0.50
4 1/3 1/2 0.50 1.00
5 1/2 3/4 1.00 3.27
6 3/4 None 3.27 ∞
NOTE: In a series of questions, respondents choose between a job with a certain income and a job with
risky income. With equal chances, the risky job will double lifetime income or cut lifetime income by a
specic fraction (downside risk). The largest risk accepted and the smallest risk rejected across gambles
dene a response category. In 1992 there are four categories 1-2, 3, 4, and 5-6. In 1994 and later surveys,
the response categories range from 1 to 6. At the lower bound of risk tolerance for a category, an individual
with CRRA utility is indierent between the certain job and a risky job with the largest downside risk
accepted. The upper bound similarly follows from the smallest downside risk rejected.
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Table 2.2: Responses to Lifetime Income Gambles
Response % by HRS Survey Wave
Category 1992 1994 1998 2000 2002
1 64.7 44.4 39.5 45.0 43.22 17.2 18.7 19.4 18.8
3 11.9 13.8 16.2 14.6 15.6
4 10.9 15.0 9.4 8.6 9.9
5 12.5 5.9 9.1 6.8 6.56 3.7 7.1 5.6 6.0
Responses 9,647 594 2,502 943 4,939
NOTE: Author's unweighted tabulations from HRS public access data les. The sample includes 12,003
individuals in the 1931 to 1947 birth cohorts. See the text for details on the sample selection. See Table 2.1
for the denition of the response category.
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High School Drop Out 22.0
H.S. Grad / Some College 57.2
College / Post Graduate 20.8
Job Displacement
Prior to Response 24.7
After to Response 12.9
Health Condition
Prior to Response 22.0
After to Response 16.8
Married
Current Status 78.9





Individual Panel Average 0.41
(0.18)
Current - Panel Average 0.04
(0.16)
Log of Income
Individual Panel Average 10.9
(0.8)
Current - Panel Average -0.04
(0.47)
Log of Wealth (Positive)
Individual Panel Average 11.5
(2.5)
Current - Panel Average -0.15
(0.75)
Responses 18,625
NOTE: Author's unweighted tabulations are from HRS public access data les and Rand HRS (Version F)
data set. The sample includes 12,003 individuals. A job displacement is a job ending with a rm closure or
layo. A health condition includes heart disease, stroke, cancer, and lung disease. Fraction exact
probability is the fraction of subjective probability questions to which the respondent gave a non-focal
answer (not 0, 50, or 100). Wealth is the total household net worth and income is the total income of the
respondent and spouse. Both variables are from the RAND HRS data and include imputations.
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Table 2.4: Household Income and Wealth





Log of Current Income 0.03 0.03
(0.03) (0.06)
Log of Positive Current Wealth 0.01 -0.03
(0.02) (0.03)
Log of | Negative Current Wealth | 0.03 0.01
(0.02) (0.03)
Direct and Type Eects: β + λ
Log of Average Income 0.09 0.14
(0.03) (0.06)
Log of Positive Average Wealth 0.003 -0.02
(0.014) (0.02)
Log of | Negative Average Wealth | 0.05 0.01
(0.03) (0.04)
Log-likelihood -23573.5 -10022.8
Number of Respondents 12,003 5,692
NOTE: Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses. Estimates in bold are statistically signicant at the
5% level. Income is total earnings, pensions, government transfers, and capital income received by the
respondent and spouse in the household. Wealth is total household wealth (including housing, vehicles,
businesses, and IRAs) minus all debts. The model in the rst column is estimated with all the gamble
responses. Appendix Table 2.9 provides the full set of covariates and estimates. The second column only
includes gamble responses from household heads who are working.
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Table 2.5: Job Displacement and Health Condition
Latent Variable: Log of Risk Tolerance
All Gamble Balanced
Parameter Respondents Panel of HRS
Direct Eect: β
Previous Job Displacement -0.06 -0.11
(0.07) (0.08)
Previous Health Condition -0.09 -0.15
(0.06) (0.07)
Type Eect: λ
Ever Job Displacement 0.19 0.20
(0.06) (0.07)
Ever Health Condition 0.02 0.06
(0.06) (0.07)
Log-likelihood -23573.5 -13426.4
Number of Respondents 12,003 6,591
NOTE: Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses. Estimates in bold are statistically signicant at the
5% level. A job displacement is a job ending with a rm closure or layo. A health condition is heart
disease, stroke, cancer, or lung disease. The model in the rst column is estimated with all the gamble
respondents. Appendix Table 2.9 provides the full set of covariates and estimates. The model in the second
column only uses the gamble responses of the individuals who respond to all six HRS waves 1992-2002.
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Table 2.6: Age, Cohort, and Time
Latent Variable: Log of Risk Tolerance
Parameter Alternate Specications of Time Eects
Age -0.017 -0.16 -0.021 -0.021
0.008 (0.09) 0.010 0.010
(0.00)
1937-1941 Cohorts 0.16 0.17 0.14 0.14
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
1942-1947 Cohorts 0.16 0.16 0.10 0.10
(0.10) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12)
(0.00)
Consumer Sentiment 0.009 0.006 0.007
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
ICS Six Months Ago 0.004
(0.003)
ICS One Year Ago -0.001
(0.003)
1994 HRS 0.27 0.19
(0.08) (0.09)
1998 HRS 0.37 0.19
(0.08) (0.11)
2000 HRS 0.32 0.12
(0.11) (0.14)
2002 HRS 0.24 0.17
(0.11) (0.11)
1992/1994 Version -0.08 -0.05
(0.09) (0.12)
Log-likelihood -23573.5 -23571.5 -23571.2 -23569.0
Parameters 55 59 59 61
NOTE: Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses. Estimates in bold are statistically signicant at the
5% level. The sample includes 12,003 individuals. The rst column is the baseline specication of the
model, see Appendix Table 2.9 for the full set of covariates and estimates. The 1931-1936 birth cohort is
the omitted cohort group. Consumer Sentiment is the value of the University of Michigan Index of
Consumer Sentiment (ICS) in the month of an individual's gamble response. Over the months with HRS
gamble responses, the ICS from the Survey of Consumers ranges from a low of 73.3 in October 1992 to high
of 111.3 in February 2000. A gamble response on the 1992 HRS survey is the omitted wave control. The
new job version of the income gamble question is asked in the 1992 and 1994 waves of the HRS.
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Table 2.7: Individual Attributes











High School Drop Out 0.02 0.09
(0.06) (0.04)
Some College 0.17 0.19
(0.05) (0.04)
College Graduate 0.22 0.25
(0.06) (0.06)
Post Graduate 0.32 0.40
(0.06) (0.06)
Direct Eect: β
Currently Married 0.11 0.10
(0.09) (0.08)
Fraction Exact Probability 0.82 0.52
(0.10) (0.09)
Type Eect: λ
Proportion of Years Married -0.27 -0.23
(0.10) (0.09)
Average FEP Across Waves 0.27 -0.05
(0.14) (0.12)
Std. Dev. of Individual Eect : σu 0.72 0.77
(0.03) (0.03)




NOTE: Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses. Estimates in bold are statistically signicant at the
5% level. The sample includes 12,003 individuals. Appendix Table 2.9 provides the full set of covariates
and estimates for the baseline model in the rst column. The model in the second column imposes
homoscedasticity on the response errors. Fraction exact probability (FEP) is the fraction of the subjection
probability questions in the survey to which an individual gives a non-focal response (not 0, 50, or 100).
The covariates under the type eects are an individual's average over the panel period.
38
Table 2.8: Decision to Own Stocks
Dependent Variable: Indicator of Stock Ownership
Marginal Eect
Subset of Parameters on Probability
Log Risk Tolerance
Individual Panel Average 0.10
(0.03)




High School Drop Out -0.15 -0.15
(0.03) (0.03)
Some College 0.06 0.04
(0.03) (0.03)
College Graduate 0.19 0.16
(0.04) (0.04)
Post Graduate 0.11 0.07
(0.04) (0.04)
Log of Current Wealth 0.14 0.15
(0.01) (0.01)
Log of Average Wealth 0.15 0.16
(0.02) (0.02)
Predicted Probability 0.31 0.34
Log-Likelihood -6904.94 -6897.3
NOTE: Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses. Estimates in bold are statistically signicant at the
5% level. The correlated random eects probit is estimated on a balanced panel with 2,464 nancial
respondents and 14,784 total observations from the 1992 to 2002 HRS. The model of stock ownership
includes all the covariates from the model of risk tolerance (see Appendix Table 2.9) except for the fraction
of exact probability responses, job displacements and health conditions. The stock ownership model adds
indicator variables for the survey waves. The marginal eect of a variable on the probability to own stocks
is computed at the median values of the variables with the random eect equal to 0.
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Appendix Table 2.9: Maximum-Likelihood Estimates of Log Risk Tolerance
Latent Variable: Log of Noisy Risk Tolerance: ξit
Mean Eect Std. Dev.









1937-1941 Cohorts 0.17 -0.01
(0.06) (0.04)
1942-1947 Cohorts 0.16 0.01
(0.10) (0.07)
Drop Out 0.02 0.07
(0.05) (0.03)
Some College 0.18 0.03
(0.05) (0.03)
College Graduate 0.23 -0.01
(0.06) (0.04)
Post College 0.34 0.03
(0.05) (0.04)
Index Consumer Sentiment / 10 0.09 -0.05
(0.02) (0.02)
Current Age / 10 -0.17 0.01
(0.08) (0.05)
Currently Married 0.18 -0.07
(0.09) (0.06)
Fraction Exact Probability 0.78 -0.44
(0.10) (0.07)
Previous Job Displacement -0.06 0.003
(0.06) (0.05)
Previous Health Condition -0.09 -0.05
(0.06) (0.05)
Log (Current + Wealth) / 10 0.11 -0.21
(0.16) (0.10)
Log (| Current − Wealth |) / 10 0.34 -0.11
(0.19) (0.12)
Log (Current Income) / 10 0.08 -0.06
(0.17) (0.10)
Proportion of Years Married -0.35 0.06
(0.10) (0.07)
Panel Average FEP 0.32 -0.57
(0.13) (0.09)
Ever Job Displacement 0.20 0.02
(0.06) (0.05)
Ever Health Condition 0.01 0.03
(0.06) (0.04)
Log (Average + Wealth) / 10 -0.02 0.28
(0.20) (0.12)
Log (| Average − Wealth |) / 10 0.16 0.38
(0.27) (0.15)
Log (Average Income) / 10 0.60 -0.48
(0.34) (0.20)
New Job Version -0.06 -0.09
(0.09) (0.06)
NOTE: The estimated standard deviation of the unpredictable persistent component is 0.72.
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Figure 2.1: Stock Market Returns and Consumer Sentiment, 1992 - 2004
















































































NOTE: The solid line is the total annual return from the S&P 500 Total Return Index (including dividends)
over the previous 12 months. The monthly value of the S&P 500 Index is the closing value on the last
business day of the month. The index from Global Financial Data is adjusted for dividends and splits. The
CPI-U removes general price ination from the return. The dashed line is the current monthly value of the
Index of Consumer Sentiment from the University of Michigan Survey of Consumers. The shaded areas
denote months in which the HRS elded the income gambles. These interview months for the ve waves
are 4/1992 to 3/1993, 5/1994 to 12/1994, 1/1998 to 3/1999, 2/2000 to 11/2000, and 4/2002 to 2/2003.
CHAPTER III
Imputing Risk Tolerance from Survey Responses
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Choices with uncertain outcomes, such as nancial investments, career paths, and health
practices, are numerous and important to welfare. Empirical studies of these behaviors
often suer from a common weakness  the inability to take into account heterogeneity
in preferences. In this paper, we develop a quantitative proxy for risk tolerance based on
responses from a large-scale survey to account for this heterogeneity. We then use the proxy
to study asset allocation.
Our measurement of risk tolerance is based on individuals' responses to questions about
hypothetical risky choices. In particular, we ask them to choose between a job with a certain
lifetime income and a job with a random, but higher mean lifetime income. We show how
to translate these ordinal responses into a cardinal proxy for risk tolerance. To construct
this proxy and use it to study behavior, we confront a number of issues. First, the survey
responses about gambles over lifetime income imply a range instead of a point value for
the unobserved cardinal preference parameter. Second, the survey responses are likely to
be subject to measurement error. We develop a statistical model addressing both issues.
Multiple responses from some individuals and renements to the survey questions isolate
the true variation in risk preferences. With the maximum-likelihood estimates, we compute
the proxy value  the expectation of risk tolerance conditional on survey responses  for
each individual. Based on a small set of survey questions, the proxy may not fully capture
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the systematic variation in risk preferences. This induces a nonstandard errors-in-variables
problem in regression estimates that use the proxy as an explanatory variable. We provide
an estimator using the proxy that is consistent despite errors in variables.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the survey questions on life-
time income gambles and the distribution of responses in the Health and Retirement Study.
Section 3.3 shows how to construct the cardinal proxy for risk tolerance from these survey
responses and Section 3.4 addresses the presence of survey response error. Researchers will
be able to use such a proxy as an explanatory variable in studying a wide range of behaviors.
In Section 3.5, we show how to estimate consistently the eect of the preference parameter
on behavior. Section 3.6 applies these procedures to study the asset allocation decision. Our
results show that our improved measure of risk preference signicantly alters the estimated
eects of risk tolerance and other observable characteristics on asset allocation. The nal
section oers conclusions.
3.2 SURVEYING RISK PREFERENCES
The Health and Retirement Study (HRS) is a large-scale, biennial survey, which began in
1992 with a representative sample of individuals between ages 51 to 61 and their spouses. In
addition to detailed nancial and demographic information, the study elicits risk preferences
using a battery of questions developed by Barsky, Juster, Kimball, and Shapiro (1997).
The Panel Study of Income Dynamics, National Longitudinal Study, Surveys of Consumers,
Dutch CentERpanel, and Chilean Social Security Survey have also elded these gambles
over lifetime income. In hypothetical scenarios, respondents choose between a certain job
and a risky job. With equal chances, the risky job will double lifetime income or cut lifetime
income by a specic fraction (or downside risk). Varying the downside risk on the new job
in subsequent questions renes the measure of risk preferences.
Specically, in 1992 the HRS poses the following scenario:
Suppose that you are the only income earner in the family, and you have a good
job guaranteed to give you your current (family) income every year for life. You are
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given the opportunity to take a new and equally good job, with a 50-50 chance it
will double your (family) income and a 50-50 chance that it will cut your (family)
income by a third. Would you take the new job?
Individuals accepting this new, risky job then consider one with a higher downside risk:
Suppose the chances were 50-50 that it would double your (family) income, and
50-50 that it would cut it in half. Would you still take the new job?
Those initially declining the new job consider one with a lower downside risk:
Suppose the chances were 50-50 that it would double your (family) income and
50-50 that it would cut it by 20 percent. Would you then take the new job?
These two responses order individuals in four categories: unwilling to risk any income cuts,
willing to risk at most a one-third cut, willing to risk a one-third to a one-half cut, and
willing to risk at least a one-half cut. In 1994 a randomly selected sub-sample answered the
questions again. In 1994 and later implementations, there were additional questions about
the willingness to accept one-tenth and three-quarter cuts. With these additional gambles,
there are six distinct response categories. The rst two columns of Table 3.1 relate these
response categories to the downside risks of the new jobs. In Section 3.3, we will discuss the
last two columns of Table 3.1 that relate the response categories to the preference parameter.
In general, the gambles over lifetime income reveal a low tolerance for risk. As reported in
Table 3.2, almost two-thirds of the respondents in 1992 are in the least risk tolerant category
1-2. The remaining one-third of respondents divide almost equally among the other three
categories. The distribution of risk categories in 1994 follows a similar pattern. Over 60%
of respondents fall in categories 1 or 2 with most choosing the least risk tolerant category 1.
Repeated observations from some individuals will be central to our statistical strategy
for separating signal from noise in the survey responses. Among the 693 respondents who
answer in the gambles in both the HRS 1992 and 1994, the simple correlation of the response
categories across the two waves is 0.27 and almost half switch response categories. Altogether,
the survey responses suggest substantial and persistent dierences in risk preferences across
individuals, but also large changes in responses within individuals across surveys.
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The 1998 HRS introduced a new situational frame for the income gambles to remove
the potential for status-quo bias. In the original question, individuals choose between their
current certain job and a new risky job. An unwillingness to switch jobs may reect their
aversion to the risky income at the new job or their desire to maintain the status quo. Status
quo bias appears to be a common feature in many settings (Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988).
In the presence of status quo bias, estimates from the original question would understate
individuals' true risk tolerance. Using a pilot study of undergraduates, Barsky et al. (1997)
estimate average risk tolerance to be 24% lower with responses to the original question than
with responses to an alternate question free of status quo bias. In 1998, 2000, and 2002, the
HRS elded a status-quo-bias-free question, in which individuals choose between two new
jobs. The question wording is
Suppose that you are the only income earner in the family. Your doctor recom-
mends that you move because of allergies, and you have to choose between two
possible jobs.
The rst would guarantee your current total family income for life. The second is
possibly better paying, but the income is also less certain. There is a 50-50 chance
the second job would double your total lifetime income and a 50-50 chance that it
would cut it by a third. Which job would you take  the rst job or the second
job?
As in the original version, follow-up questions vary the downside risk of the second job
and responses assign individuals to one of six categories. Starting in 2000, the job-related
gambles are targeted to individuals less than age 65. The nal three columns of Table
3.2 shows the responses to the status-quo-bias-free question. In this paper, we restrict the
sample to original respondents of the HRS who answered the gambles in 1992 or 1994. The
respondents in 1998 to the new question do appear more risk tolerant with only 56.9% in
category 1-2 compared to 64.6% in 1992 and 61.5% in 1994. This dierence disappears in the
last two survey waves. Nonetheless, variation in the question wording allows us to estimate
the status-quo bias and question-specic responses errors.
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This approach to measuring risk preference from hypothetical gambles in the HRS diers
fundamentally from earlier survey measurement of attitudes toward risk. Other surveys
commonly use categorical responses with vague quantiers to probe risk preferences. For
example, beginning in 1983, the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) asks respondents:
Which of the statements comes closest to the amount of nancial risk that you and
your (spouse/partner) are willing to take when you save or make investments?
1. take substantial nancial risks expecting to earn substantial returns
2. take above average nancial risks expecting to earn above average returns
3. take average nancial risks expecting to earn average returns
4. not willing to take any nancial risks
While intended to order respondents by their risk tolerance, the subjective wording may gen-
erate uninterpretable variation. Since individuals must dene substantial," above average,"
and average" nancial risks and returns, we cannot quantify dierences across responses.
In contrast, the income gambles on the HRS supply objective boundaries between risk cat-
egories. In the next section, we use economic theory to map survey responses to a cardinal
proxy for risk tolerance.
Using the cardinal proxy has several advantages. First, it provides a unidimensional,
quantitative measure of risk tolerance that allows meaningful interpersonal comparisons.
Second, in many settings, such as the demand for risky assets that we study in Section
3.6, economic theory makes predictions that link risk preference parameters quantitatively
to economic decisions. Third, by having a quantitative measure we can correct for the
measurement error inevitable with proxies based on survey responses.
3.3 CONSTRUCTING A CARDINAL PROXY
Expected utility theory provides a cardinal metric for risk preference  the coecient of
relative risk tolerance. Denote an individual's concave utility function over original lifetime
income as U(W ). Faced with 50-50 gambles of doubling lifetime income or cutting it by
various fractions π, an individual should accept the risky job when its expected utility exceeds
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the utility from the certain job  that is, if
0.5U(2W ) + 0.5U((1− π)W ) ≥ U(W ).(3.1)
The greater the curvature of U , the smaller the downside risk π an individual will accept. As-
sociating gamble responses more tightly with underlying risk tolerance requires a parametric
utility function.
We assume that constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) well approximates individuals'




where the coecient of relative risk tolerance θ may dier across individuals. This form
implies that relative risk tolerance, θ = −U ′/WU ′′ (Pratt 1964), is constant across all values
of lifetime income for a given individual. Analysis of the gamble responses with household
income and wealth supports this utility specication (Sahm 2007). We focus on relative risk
tolerance θ rather than relative risk aversion 1/θ because relative risk tolerance is linearly
related to demand for risky nancial assets (Breeden 1979). While the survey does not
directly measure risk tolerance, the responses to the income gambles with this utility function
establish boundaries on the underlying preference parameter.
To illustrate how to bound risk tolerance, consider individuals in response category 3. By
accepting the risky job when the downside risk is one-fth, but declining when the downside
risk is one-third, these individuals reveal risk tolerance between 0.27 and 0.50. Each bound
for this category equates the expected utility of a new risky job and the current certain job:




















Substituting the largest downside risk accepted and smallest risk rejected from Table 3.1,
we similarly determine the lower and upper bounds for the other categories. The last two
47
columns of Table 3.1 report the bounds for each response category. The categories exhaust
the possible range of risk tolerance.
In the next section, we consider a more general model that accounts for measurement error
and other features of the question. To illustrate how we map the discrete responses into a
continuous distribution, assume that true risk tolerance follows a log-normal distribution,
log θ ≡ x ∼ N(µ, σ2x) .(3.5)
The lognormal functional form has several advantages. First, it imposes the restriction
that relative risk tolerance is nonnegative. Second, it is parsimonious and computationally
simple. Third, we are able to use the moment generating function of the normal to calculate
analytically the unconditional and conditional expectations of θ = exp(x). Finally, the
lognormal appears to t the data well. It can capture the fact that the modal value of
relative risk tolerance is close to zero but that a substantial fraction of individuals have
higher risk tolerance.
We use standard maximum likelihood methods to estimate the mean µ and variance σ2x of
log risk tolerance in the population. Consider rst a case in which we observe one response
category c for each individual. The probability of being in category j is
P(c = j) = P(log θj < x < log θj) =
= Φ
(
(log θj − µ)/σx
)− Φ ((log θj − µ)/σx
)
(3.6)
where Φ(·) is the cumulative normal distribution function. Maximizing the sample log-
likelihood of the individuals' rst gamble response, yields a mean log risk tolerance of −1.98
and a standard deviation of 1.76 as reported in the rst column of Table 3.3. These pa-
rameters are precisely estimated: both have an asymptotic standard error of 0.03. For the
maximum-likelihood estimation, we use the modied method of scoring where the sample
average of the outer product of the score function approximates the information matrix.
For many applications, it is valuable to assign a numerical risk tolerance proxy for each
individual conditional on his or her survey responses. Using the estimated population pa-
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rameters, we can impute log risk tolerance conditional on a survey response in category j
as
E(log θ|c = j) = µ + σx
φ
(
(log θj − µ)/σx




(log θj − µ)/σx
)− Φ ((log θj − µ)/σx
)(3.7)
where φ(·) is the standard normal density function. Alternately, from the moment generating









(log θj − µ− σ2x)/σx




(log θj − µ)/σx
)− Φ ((log θj − µ)/σx
) .(3.8)
Given the parameter estimates, the proxy, h = E(θ|c), has four values, 0.083, 0.367, 0.706,
and 3.687 for individuals in response categories 1-2, 3, 4, and 5-6. Unlike ordinal rankings,
this proxy quanties the average dierence in log risk tolerance across the risk categories.
3.4 ADDRESSING SURVEY RESPONSE ERROR
Responses to hypothetical income gambles likely provide a noisy signal of true risk toler-
ance. Thus the risk tolerance proxy from the previous section is also error-prone. Statistical
procedures that use the risk tolerance proxy will be subject to errors-in-variables problems.
In particular, using the proxy as an explanatory variable in a regression will lead to atten-
uation biases and inconsistent coecient estimates. Since a key aim of including the risk
questions on large-scale surveys is to provide researchers with a means to control for het-
erogeneity in preferences, it is critical to address and correct for the consequences of survey
response error.
That some individuals give multiple responses to the risk tolerance questions provides
a lever for quantifying survey response error. By making the structural assumption that
preferences are immutable, we attribute the common component in an individual's answers
to true preference and the changes to response error. Recall that x = log(θ) is the individual's
true preference parameter. With two versions of the gamble question, we also incorporate a
question-specic persistent response error. The survey response error in wave w to question
type q is a normal disturbance εqw added to x that leads the individual to choose the gamble
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response category corresponding to the sum ξqw. The error εqw can be interpreted either as
an individual's misperception of his or her risk tolerance or an error the individual makes in
calculating the bounds (θj, θj) that map preferences into the gambles. Hence
ξqw = x + εqw = x + bq + κq + eqw(3.9)
where bq is a common bias across individuals of question type q, κq is the individual's
persistent response error for question type q, and eqw is the individual's transitory response
error for a particular wave w and question type q. The components are distributed as
ξqw ∼ N(µ + bq, σ2q ), κq ∼ N(0, σ2κq), and eqw ∼ N(0, σ2eq) with σ2q = σ2x + σ2κq + σ2eq. The
covariance in responses across waves for dierent question types depends only on the variance
of true risk tolerance. For the same question type, the variance of the persistent error
also aects the covariance across waves. We assume that the survey response error is a
purely random  or classical"  measurement error. Specically, the response error εqw is
independent of an individual's true risk tolerance and any other attributes.
We analyze the two question types, the original question o and the status-quo-bias-free
question f , so q ∈ {o, f}. In each wave, only one question type is asked. We assume that
the new version is not subject to status quo bias on average, so bf = 0 and ξfw ∼ N(µ, σ2f ).
Identication of the parameters requires that at least some individuals answer the gambles
more than once and some of the multiple responders answer the same question type more
than once. Of the 11,616 individuals in our sample, all answer the original question at least
once and 4,244 individuals answer a status-quo-bias-free question. There are 693 individuals
who answer the original question twice. For the bias-free question, 471 individuals answer
in two surveys and 278 in three surveys.
In Section 3.3, we discuss how an individual with true log risk tolerance x will be assigned
to a category by responses to the survey questions. Survey response error can move the
individual into a dierent category from wave to wave and aects assignment to response
categories even for those who answer only in one wave. For individuals who respond in only
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one wave, the likelihood of category j is
P (cw = j) = Φ
(









This likelihood depends on the variance of error-prone risk tolerance, σ2q , not that of true
risk tolerance, σ2x. Obviously, if all individuals answered in only one wave to one question
type, the problem is under-identied.
For those answering the income gambles in both waves, the probability of observing
category j in wave w and category k in wave w′ is
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where −→Φ(·) is the bivariate normal cumulative distribution function. When the question
type is the same, that is, q = q′, the correlation, ρ, between the variables ξqw and ξqw′ is the
fraction (σ2x +σ2kq)/σ2q of the total variance of the error-prone variable due to true log relative
risk tolerance plus the question-specic persistent response error. When the question types
dier, that is, q 6= q′, the correlation is σ2x/σqσq′ where the covariance depends only on the
variation in true log relative risk tolerance. Unlike the typical multiple indicator solution to
the errors-in-variables problem, identication here does not require repeat observations from
all individuals in the sample.
Maximizing the sample log-likelihood with respect to µ, σx, σκo, σκf , σeo, and σef yields
consistent estimates of the parameters. The second column of Table 3.3 reports the estimates.
The estimated mean of log risk tolerance −1.84 is somewhat higher in this model with
multiple gamble responses and question-specic response errors. The original question type is
associated with an 11% lower reported risk tolerance. While this status quo bias is relatively
modest, it is statistically dierent from zero. A more substantial shift occurs in the estimated
variation of true log risk tolerance, as the estimate of the standard deviation falls to 0.73
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from 1.76. Most of this decline is from modeling transitory response error using multiple
gamble responses of some individuals. The modeling of question-specic persistent response
error also lowers the estimated heterogeneity in true preferences somewhat. Together this
implies a much lower estimate of mean risk tolerance in the population: 0.21 instead of
0.65. The variability from response error greatly exceeds that from true risk tolerance. This
nding highlights the limited test-retest reliability of the gambles and the need for multiple
responses from some individuals. Nonetheless, the income gambles still convey much useful
information on preferences as the application in Section 3.6 validates.
Ignoring survey response error overstates the heterogeneity in risk preferences. As noted,
this causes an upward bias in estimated average risk tolerance. This eect is not dependent
on the lognormal specication. Given the nonnegativity of risk tolerance, noise will in general
shift the mean of the distribution of exp(ξ) to the right. Figure 3.1 illustrates the eects
of response error. The solid line is the empirical distribution of the discrete responses in
1992 from Table 3.2 using the bounds (θj, θj) in Table 3.1. The solid curve is the tted
lognormal distribution of true risk tolerance θ = exp(x). The dashed curve is the tted
lognormal distribution of the true parameter plus noise, exp(x + ε). The gure shows how
the distribution of the true parameter moves mass away from the extremes relative to the
distribution that includes noise from response errors.
Table 3.4 summarizes additional features of the estimated distribution of true risk prefer-
ences based on the parameter estimates in the second column of Table 3.3. The rst column
shows the distribution of log risk tolerance. The second column shows the distribution of the
level of risk tolerance. The estimated mode of 0.094 indicates that the bulk of respondents
have very low risk tolerance. Yet, there are enough respondents with relatively high risk
tolerance to pull the mean substantially above the mode. About 25% of respondents are
estimated to have risk tolerance greater than or equal to 0.259, and about 10% have risk
tolerance greater than 0.402. Yet, virtually no respondents have risk tolerance as high as
one (logarithmic utility).
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For many applications  notably demand for risky assets  relative risk tolerance θ is the
relevant preference parameter (Breeden 1979, Barsky et al. 1997). But in other applications,
such as the strength of the precautionary saving motive, its reciprocal 1/θ, relative risk
aversion, would be the parameter of interest (Carroll and Kimball 2007). When preferences
are heterogeneous across individuals, the reciprocal of average relative risk tolerance is not
equal to the average of its reciprocal. The last column of Table 3.4 gives the parameters and
fractiles of the distribution of relative risk aversion. For our parameter estimates, average
relative risk tolerance is 0.206. The estimated average of relative risk aversion is 8.2, which
is far greater than 1/0.206 = 4.9. This dierence between the expectation of the reciprocal
and the reciprocal of the expectation is a powerful example of Jensen's inequality. Jensen's
inequality gets its bite in this application from the substantial heterogeneity in preferences,
the concavity of the 1/θ function, and the concentrated mass of the probability density near
zero, where the function 1/θ is most curved.
Many researchers will want to impute risk tolerance for individuals. As our proxy for
individual risk preference, we calculate the expected risk tolerance conditional on an indi-
vidual's responses, using the estimated distributional parameters of our statistical model.
The formula is similar to equation (3.8) in Section 3.3 except that it now accounts for
question-specic response error and multiple responses to the gamble questions. Table 3.5
reports the proxy values of risk tolerance, as well as of log risk tolerance and risk aversion, for
respondents to one status-quo-bias-free question. The proxy of risk tolerance for response
category 1 (reject job with one-tenth downside risk) is 0.153. The range of relative risk
tolerance corresponding to those preferences is from 0 to 0.13. (See Table 3.1.) Hence, the
proxy value for this response lies slightly higher than the range. For risk category 2, the
proxy of 0.203 lies near the center of the range from 0.13 to 0.27. With the more risk tolerant
response categories, the proxy values are substantially lower than the range. For example,
category 5 (accept a job with one-third downside risk but reject a job with one-half downside
risk), the proxy of 0.301 lies far below the low end of the range from 1.0 to 3.7. The proxy
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values of log risk tolerance and risk aversion follow a similar pattern, as do the proxies from
a response to the original question type. Hence, correcting for response error shifts the proxy
toward the unconditional mean. Yet, substantial heterogeneity and meaningful quantitative
dierences remain even after this correction.
For those answering in multiple waves, we use all their responses to sharpen the esti-
mate of their relative risk tolerance. These additional responses greatly widen the range
of proxy values. The lowest imputed value of risk tolerance in our sample is 0.087 and
the highest value is 0.732. When individuals give dierent responses across waves, we
adjust the proxy values accordingly. Table 3.5 contains only a small subset of the 370
unique proxy values observed in this sample. For researchers who wish to make impu-
tations based on our parameter values for any possible response to the HRS questions,
we provide a spreadsheet of all possible values of risk tolerance and risk aversion online
(http://www.umich.edu/∼shapiro/data/risk_preference).
3.5 STUDYING BEHAVIOR WITH THE PROXY
A major application of our proxy for risk tolerance is its use as a regressor to control
for heterogeneity in preferences when studying a wide range of behaviors. The proxy is the
conditional expectation of true risk tolerance. Hence, the deviation of the proxy from the
true variable u = θ − h is not a classical measurement error. In particular, the deviation is
correlated with the true variable, not the proxy. In this section, we discuss the non-standard
errors-in-variables problem that arises from use of the proxy and present an estimator that
addresses this problem.
To study the eects of risk tolerance and other regressors on behavior, consider a model
y = θδθ + zδz + ν(3.12)
where θ is true risk tolerance and z is a 1×K vector of observables that also aect the behavior
of interest y. To simplify later analysis, all variables are expressed as deviations from their
means. We make the assumptions that, conditional on the regressors, the population error
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is mean zero, E(ν|θ, z) = 0, and that the expected outer product matrix of (θ, z) has full
rank. If we observed true risk tolerance and the other regressors, OLS would consistently
estimate the population parameters, δ = (δθ, δ′z)′.
Now consider the use of the proxy. Substituting the proxy h = E(θ|c) in (3.12), we have
y = hδθ + zδz + η(3.13)
where
η = uδθ + ν .(3.14)
The composite error term η includes an expectation error u = θ − h and the structural
error term ν. Unlike a classical measurement error, the deviation u of the proxy from the
true variable is uncorrelated with the proxy h and correlated with the true variable θ. This
implies that in a univariate linear regression of a dependent variable y on only the proxy h,
there is no attenuation bias and the OLS coecient is consistent.
In a multivariate setting, the OLS estimator using the proxy is unlikely to provide con-
sistent estimates of the population parameters, δ = (δθ, δ′z)′. The proxy of risk tolerance
h = E(θ|c) only conditions on an individual's gamble response categories, so regressors z
that are correlated with true risk tolerance θ would also correlate with the expectation er-
ror u. For example, men may be more risk tolerant than women. Then gender would be
correlated with the expectation error. Using the proxy with a standard set of demographic
regressors, the OLS coecient estimate for men would mix the direct eects of gender with
the indirect eects of risk tolerance. A more general statement of the problem is that
E(z′h) 6= E(z′θ) .(3.15)
The lack of equality in (3.15) arises because of the correlation between the proxy's expectation
error u and the regressors z, which also implies that OLS is inconsistent.
We have enough structure on the problem to derive moment conditions that will allow for
a consistent estimator using the proxy. The assumption of purely random response error and
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the properties of conditional expectations imply that the proxy is uncorrelated with both
the structural error term ν and the expectation error u. This yields the following moment
condition for the proxy:
E(hη) = E(hu)δθ + E(hν) = 0 .(3.16)
To formulate a moment condition for the other observables, we assume that the conditional
expectation of each observable zk in the vector z is linear in risk tolerance, such that
zk = θβk + ζ(3.17)
where E(ζ|θ) = 0 and βk = E(θ2)−1E(θzk). The linear specication serves as a good
approximation and could be extended to a risk tolerance vector that includes higher order
terms. With purely random response error, ζ is independent of the response error ε, which
together with θ determines the proxy h. This implies that E(hζ) = 0. By denition, the
proxy h is also uncorrelated with the expectation error u = θ− h. Substituting the proxy in
(3.17), we have
zk = hβk + uβk + ζ(3.18)
so the regression of zk on the proxy h consistently estimates βk, that is, βk = E(θ2)−1E(θzk) =
E(h2)−1E(hzk). We dene the true-to-proxy variance ratio as




2) = λE(hzk) for all zk ∈ z(3.20)
where the rst equality uses the population estimate of βk in terms of θ, the second equality
uses the denition of λ, and the third equality uses the population estimate of βk in terms
of h. We restate the model in (3.12) with the proxy h adjusted by λ as
y = λhδθ + zδz + ω(3.21)
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where
ω = (θ − λh)δθ + ν .(3.22)
With (3.16) and (3.20), we have two sets of orthogonality conditions which identify the
model:
E(hη) = E[h(y − hδθ − zδz)] = 0(3.23)
E(z′ω) = E[z′(y − λhδθ − zδz)] = 0.(3.24)
The second orthogonality condition eectively multiples the covariance of z with the proxy
h by the variance ratio λ to get the implied covariance of z with θ.
The estimator of δ will be based on the sample estimates of the proxy h and the true-to-
proxy variance ratio λ. We can implement this GMM estimator because we have an estimate
of λ from the maximum-likelihood estimation. This situation contrasts with standard errors-
in-variables setting where the true-to-proxy variance ratio is unidentied. Substituting the





























Under the conditions specied, these will be consistent estimates of δ and have a limiting
normal distribution. Note the ratio λ in the lower left block of the inverted matrix. There
are three cases in which this estimator is identical to the OLS estimator: rst, when there
are no regressors other than risk tolerance; second, when none of the other regressors are
correlated with true risk tolerance; and third, when there is no expectation error for the
proxy, i.e., θ = h, so λ = 1. Taking into account that the proxy variance is attenuated with
respect to the true preference parameter is important in multivariate models with strong
correlations between the other regressors and risk tolerance.
The asymptotic distribution of the estimator in (3.25) is
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While we do not directly observe risk tolerance, we can still compute an implied R2 for




















Using the standard R2 from a regression with the proxy would understate the explanatory
power of the model, since the variability of the proxy understates the true variability of
risk tolerance. Table 3.6 shows that this understatement is substantial. The ratio λ of the
variance of the true risk tolerance to the proxy is 6.32. When the other regressors are strongly
correlated with risk tolerance, the GMM estimator in (3.25) and the implied R2 in (3.28)
will more accurately characterize the eects of risk tolerance on behavior than standard
estimators. Even in a univariate regression on risk tolerance alone, equation (3.28) is needed
to calculate the implied R2.
3.6 APPLICATION TO ASSET ALLOCATION
In this section, we apply the methods discussed above to study asset allocation. Faced
with uncertain asset returns, risk preferences should be central in allocating nancial wealth
between high risk and low risk assets. Individuals with greater risk tolerance should be will-
ing to hold a larger fraction of their wealth in risky assets, such as stocks. Under complete
markets, only risk tolerance and the distribution of risky asset returns aect allocations
(Samuelson 1969, Merton 1969). Many individuals also anticipate labor income, which can-
not be capitalized due to moral hazard and adverse selection. With market incompleteness,
models of asset allocation also identify a role for the determinants of future labor income,
such as age and the distribution of income shocks (Heaton and Lucas 1997). Empirical stud-
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ies often document substantial dierences in asset allocation by gender, education, and race.
Nonetheless, much of the heterogeneity in asset allocation remains unexplained.
In contrast with other empirical studies of asset allocation, our risk tolerance proxy allows
us to control quantitatively for the eects of risk preference cross-sectionally. In this section,
using data from the HRS, we present estimates of how the share of nancial wealth held
in stocks increases with risk tolerance. We also consider other regressors such as gender,
education, age, race, household income and wealth. While households typically own assets
jointly, many of these attributes are person-specic. We treat the respondent who is most
knowledgeable about household nances as the primary decision-maker and control for his
or her attributes. We limit our analysis to households with positive nancial wealth and
income. Since the HRS is a sample of older households who have often accumulated some
wealth, this selection eliminates fewer observations than it would in an age-representative
sample. Nonetheless, it does exclude approximately 20% of households. The average share of
nancial wealth in stocks (excluding individual retirement accounts) is 0.16 and a signicant
portion of households do not own stocks. The standard deviation of the share in stocks is
0.29, so there is considerable dispersion in stock allocations.
To demonstrate the usefulness of our risk tolerance proxy h and the true-to-proxy variance
ratio λ, we contrast our GMM estimates with the OLS estimates that use the risk tolerance
variable without taking into account response error. While focusing on the eects of risk
tolerance, we also discuss the eects of gender and education. We use the estimated eects
from these regressors to demonstrate the misleading inferences from failing to take into
account risk tolerance heterogeneity and also failing to correct for the consequences of survey
response error in the risk tolerance proxy.
As a baseline, we estimate the stock allocation model without any control for risk tol-
erance. This corresponds to the approach in most empirical studies. As reported in Table
3.7, the gender, education, and race of the nancial respondent as well as the household's
log income and log nancial assets account for 17.0% of the variation in stock allocations.
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In this specication, households with men responsible for the nances have 2.4 percentage
points more in stocks on average. Post-college education raises the share by 3.4 percentage
points. Both are statistically signicant and represent 15% and 22% of the average stock
allocation.
If any of these characteristics correlate with risk tolerance, then their estimated coecients
also include the indirect eects of risk tolerance. One way to try to sort out the direct eects
of risk tolerance on stock holding and to study the confounding eect of gender, education
and other regressors is to estimate a model of asset allocation controlling for the categorical
survey responses to the income gambles. Based on their rst response in the HRS, we
assign individuals to four risk tolerance categories. This regression with categorical controls
explains 17.2% of the variation in stock allocations. Households in the most risk tolerant
category hold 2.5 percentage points more of their wealth in stocks than those in the least
risk tolerant category. But the relationship is nonlinear as households in the second lowest
risk tolerant category hold 2.6 percentage points less in stocks than those in the least risk
tolerant category. Adding the categorical controls diminishes the eect of a male nancial
respondent to 2.3 percentage points and post-college education to 3.2. These results are
consistent with the Barsky et al. (1997) nding that men and the most educated are more
risk tolerant. Even partially controlling for risk preferences begins to lower the estimated
eect of these attributes on asset allocation.
The last four columns of estimates in Table 3.7 use dierent versions of the cardinal
proxy for risk tolerance and dierent estimators. In the third column, we use the proxy
from Section 3.3, which ignores survey response error. All else equal, the most risk tolerant
households based on one observation (risk tolerance of 3.687) average 2.9 percentage points
more in stocks than the least risk tolerant households (risk tolerance of 0.049).
The fourth column of Table 3.7 uses the proxy from Section 3.4 that accounts for the
measurement error in the gamble responses but does not address the potential correlation
between the proxy's expectation error and the other regressors discussed in Section 3.5.
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These results show that ignoring survey response error greatly understates the marginal eect
of risk tolerance on stock allocations. When we use the proxy values from Section 3.4, the
coecient estimate for the proxy increases over ten-fold. This increase shows how attenuation
bias aects the estimates in the previous two columns that do not account for response error.
Of course, this correction mainly scales up the coecient estimate and does not aect the
R2. The larger estimated eect of risk tolerance means that when risk tolerance is measured
more precisely with multiple responses that the predicted dierences in behavior can be
substantial. The most risk tolerant households based on multiple observations (risk tolerance
of 0.732) average 9.4 percentage points more wealth in stocks than the least risk tolerant
(risk tolerance of 0.087). This dierence represents 60% of the average stock share. Thus
correcting for measurement error has a substantial impact on the estimated responsiveness
of behavior to risk tolerance.
The fth column of Table 3.7 uses the same proxy for risk tolerance as in the fourth column
but replaces the OLS estimator with the GMM estimator derived in Section 3.5. The GMM
estimates show the importance of accounting for the correlation between the expectation
error of the proxy and the other regressors. Using formula (3.28) for the implied R2, the
explained variation in stock allocations rises to 17.8% from 17.1%. The point estimate for the
eect of risk tolerance rises 11% to 0.162. The average dierence in stock allocations of the
most and least risk tolerant households with multiple responses increases over one percentage
point to 10.5. The GMM estimator has a more pronounced eect on the coecient estimates
for other regressors. As stressed in Section 3.5, the main issue is that in the OLS estimate the
other regressors will spuriously account for variation in the dependent variable to the extent
that they are correlated with risk tolerance. Having a male nancial respondent now raises
stock allocations by only 1.4 percentage points and the eect of a post-college education
falls to 1.2 percentage points. These coecient estimates are 42% and 65% lower than in
the regression with no measure of risk tolerance and are no longer statistically dierent from
zero at the 5% level.
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As a check on the accuracy of the GMM estimator, the last column of Table 3.7 looks at an
alternative estimator. Instead of basing the proxy just on the gamble response categories, we
also condition on the regressors in this application. Specically, in the rst-step maximum-
likelihood, we model the mean of log risk tolerance µ as a linear function of the observables
z. The estimated unconditional mean and variance of log risk tolerance from this alternative
rst-step maximum-likelihood model are reported in the last column of Table 3.3. The
estimated distribution does not dier substantially from the model that conditions on only
the gamble responses. This is a direct approach to eliminate the correlation between the
proxy's expectation error and the observables. Condition (3.15) now holds with equality
and the OLS estimator with this new proxy consistently estimates the model with true risk
tolerance. The last two columns of Table 3.7 are very similar. This nding implies that
the GMM approach, which does not rely on re-estimating the proxy conditional on all the
covariates in the regressions, works well.
The results in Table 3.7 demonstrate the importance of carefully controlling for the hetero-
geneity in preferences. Beyond using the proxy to control for heterogeneity in risk tolerance,
we show how the eect of other regressors can be overstated if no correction is made for
the fact that the proxy is imperfectly measured and the other regressors are correlated with
preferences. For researchers who want to include an individual measure of risk tolerance in
their studies of other behaviors, our maximum-likelihood estimates provide a valid proxy. To
the extent that this proxy's expectation error is correlated with other explanatory variables
of interest, the OLS estimates can be misleading. This problem can be addressed with the
GMM estimator that we derive in Section 3.5 or can be avoided by conditioning on the
other variables in the rst-step maximum-likelihood. While the second alternative might
be the best approach, the Health and Retirement Study is currently the only data set with
a sucient panel to correct for the survey response error in the gamble responses. When
the rst-step maximum-likelihood is not possible (for example, because of having only one
response per individual), the proxy values we provide that condition only on the gamble
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responses should be used with the GMM estimator to obtain consistent estimates.
3.7 CONCLUSION
We demonstrate the importance of carefully controlling for risk preferences when examin-
ing asset allocation. In particular, our procedures address many issues in using survey-based
measures of risk tolerance  translation of categorical responses to a cardinal metric, sur-
vey response error, and expectation error for the proxy. Our methods for constructing the
proxy and estimating the eects of risk tolerance on behavior have a wide range of potential
applications. A growing number of surveys including the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
in the United States, the CentERpanel in the Netherlands, and the Social Security Survey in
Chile have elded lifetime income gambles like those in the HRS. Our statistical procedures
for constructing the risk tolerance proxy can be applied with minimal adjustment to these
other surveys.
In studies of asset allocation (Vissing-Jorgensen 2002) and intergenerational wealth cor-
relations (Charles and Hurst 2003), researchers have used indicator variables from income
gamble responses. This approach does not fully capture the eect of heterogeneous risk
preferences. According to our empirical analysis, even if the direct eects of risk tolerance
are not central to the study, such indicator variables are unlikely to adequately control for
risk tolerance. In other words, these partial controls are not sucient either in theory or
practice for consistent estimates of the direct eects of other variables of interest. With
survey questions and statistical techniques motivated by economic theory, we expand the
options for studying the eects of risk preferences on behavior. Using the quantitative proxy
for risk tolerance, we nd a strong eect of risk tolerance on stock holding. Moreover, after
accounting for how errors in measured risk tolerance are correlated with other variables, the
estimated eects of gender and education on asset allocation are substantially reduced.
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Both the OLS and GMM estimates in Table 3.7 use the risk tolerance proxy h, which is a
generated regressor from the rst-step maximum-likelihood procedure. The variance ratio λ
is another generated regressor in the GMM estimator. While the coecient estimates from
these second-step estimators are asymptotically consistent, the estimated standard errors do
not reect the sampling variation in the proxy and the variance ratio. We use a bootstrap
to show this sampling variation does not qualitatively alter our inferences in Section 3.6.
Using a Monte Carlo experiment, we draw 199 random samples from the data and repeat
the two steps of estimation in Section 3.4 and Section 3.6. Sampling with replacement, we
maintain the distribution of respondents to the original and status-quo-bias-free questions.
We use a symmetric t-test to construct the 95% bootstrap condence on the proxy coecient
estimate in the asset allocation model. The OLS estimate in the fourth column of Table 3.7
of 0.146 has a condence interval of 0.036 to 0.256. The GMM estimate of in the fth column
of Table 3.7 0.162 has a condence interval of 0.040 to 0.284. In both cases, the estimated
eect of risk tolerance on asset allocation remains statistically signicant at the 5% level.
As expected, sampling variation in the generated regressors has little eect on the inference
of the other controls. The moderate impact of the generated regressors reects the precision
of the rst-step maximum likelihood procedure.
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Table 3.1: Risk Tolerance Response Categories
Downside Risk Bounds on
Response of Risky Job Risk Tolerance
Category Accepted Rejected Lower Upper
1 None 1/10 0 0.13
2 1/10 1/5 0.13 0.27
3 1/5 1/3 0.27 0.50
4 1/3 1/2 0.50 1.00
5 1/2 3/4 1.00 3.27
6 3/4 None 3.27 ∞
NOTE: Respondents choose between a job with a certain income and a job with risky income. With equal
chances, the risky job will double lifetime income or cut it by the specic fraction shown in the columns
labelled downside risk. The largest risk accepted and smallest risk rejected across gambles dene a
response category. In 1992 there are four categories 1-2, 3, 4, and 5-6. In 1994 and later surveys, there are
six response categories. The last two columns show the bounds on relative risk tolerance consistent with
these response categories in the absence of response error.
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Table 3.2: Distribution of Risk Tolerance Responses
Response % by HRS Wave
Category 1992 1994 1998 2000 2002
1 64.6 43.4 37.9 46.3 44.82 18.1 19.0 18.4 18.6
3 11.6 13.5 17.0 14.4 15.3
4 10.9 14.5 10.8 8.1 9.6
5 12.9 6.3 8.0 7.5 6.16 4.2 7.3 5.3 5.6
Responses 11,592 717 796 884 3,591
NOTE: Tabulations use responses on the nal release version of HRS 1992, 1994, 1998, 2000, and 2002
without sample weights. The sample for this paper includes the 11,616 original respondents in the HRS
study who answer a gamble in one of the rst two waves. See Table 3.1 for denition of the risk tolerance
response categories.
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Mean µ -1.98 -1.84 -1.86
(0.03) (0.03) (0.07)
Standard Deviation σx 1.76 0.73 0.73
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Status Quo Bias bo -0.11 -0.10
(0.04) (0.07)
Response Error Standard Deviation
Original Question, Transitory σeo 1.39 1.40
(0.05) (0.05)
Original Question, Persistent σκo 0.73 0.72
(0.10) (0.10)
SQB-Free Question, Transitory σef 1.43 1.42
(0.03) (0.03)
SQB-Free Question, Persistent σκf 0.60 0.61
(0.09) (0.09)
Number of Individuals 11,616 11,616 11,616
Number of Responses 11,616 17,580 17,580
Number of Parameters 2 7 19
Log-Likelihood -12073.4 -21208.3 -21121.3
NOTE: The rst column estimates the model in Section 3.3. The second column models survey response
error, as described in Section 3.4. The model of log risk tolerance in the third column includes the
covariates from the application in Section 3.6. Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 3.4: Distribution of Risk Preferences
Log Risk Risk Risk
Tolerance Tolerance Aversion
Mean -1.84 0.206 8.2
(0.03) (0.009) (0.3)
Median -1.84 0.159 6.3
(0.03) (0.005) (0.2)
Mode -1.84 0.094 3.7
(0.03) (0.004) (0.2)
Std. Dev. 0.73 0.172 6.8
(0.04) (0.018) (0.7)
Fractiles
1 -1.54 0.029 1.2
5 -1.32 0.048 1.9
10 -1.20 0.063 2.5
25 -1.01 0.097 3.9
50 -0.80 0.159 6.3
75 -0.59 0.259 10.3
90 -0.40 0.402 16.0
95 -0.28 0.523 20.8
99 -0.07 0.858 34.1
NOTE: The values are calculated from the parameter estimates in the the second column of Table 3.3.
Asymptotic standard errors approximated with the delta method are in parenthesis.
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Table 3.5: Imputation of Risk Preference
Response Log Risk Risk Risk
Category Tolerance Tolerance Aversion
1 -2.107 0.153 10.4
2 -1.811 0.203 7.6
3 -1.693 0.228 6.7
4 -1.575 0.257 6.0
5 -1.419 0.301 5.1
6 -1.172 0.387 4.0
NOTE: The proxy values are for responses to a single SQB-free question and are based on the estimates in
the second column of Table 3.3. The values dier for persons answering in multiple surveys, the original
question type, or in the combined categories 1-2 and 5-6. We provide a spreadsheet of all possible values
online (http://www.umich.edu/∼shapiro/data/risk_preference).
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Table 3.6: True-to-Proxy Variance Ratio λ
Estimate
Variance
Risk Tolerance θ 0.030
Proxy h = E(θ|c) 0.005
True-to-Proxy Ratio λ 6.319
NOTE: The estimated variance of true risk tolerance and its proxy depend on the estimated parameters in
the second column of Table 3.3. Section 3.4 describes the relationship between survey responses and the
proxy values. The true-to-proxy variance ratio λ is an input to the GMM estimator in (3.25) and the R2 in
(3.28).
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Table 3.7: Eect of Risk Preferences on the Share of Financial Wealth in Stocks
Risk Tolerance Proxy
Categorical Ignoring Modeling Modeling Including
Control for Log Survey Response Response Response Application
Risk Tolerance None Response Error Error Error Covariates







Proxy 0.008 0.146 0.162 0.152
(0.003) (0.054) (0.060) (0.056)
Male 0.024 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.014 0.018
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Education
> 16 Years 0.034 0.032 0.032 0.031 0.012 0.019
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014)
13-16 Years 0.036 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.024 0.029
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
< 12 Years -0.023 -0.024 -0.023 -0.023 -0.026 -0.024
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Black -0.029 -0.029 -0.029 -0.028 -0.024 -0.027
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Hispanic -0.035 -0.036 -0.035 -0.035 -0.034 -0.038
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012)
Age / 10 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.006 0.006
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Log Income 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.003
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Log Wealth 0.046 0.047 0.046 0.046 0.047 0.046
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
R2 0.170 0.172 0.171 0.171 0.178 0.178
NOTE: Regressions include 5,818 households with positive nancial wealth and total income in 1992.
Individual attributes are from the household's nancial respondent. Share of wealth in stocks has a mean
of 0.158 and a standard deviation of 0.286. Estimated coecients in bold are statistically signicant at the
5% level. Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses. In the second to last column the GMM estimates
are based on the formula in (3.25) and the R2 in the last two columns is based on the formula in (3.28).
For the application sub-sample, the true-to-proxy variance ratio λ is 6.40. In the last column, the proxy is
constructed from a model of log risk tolerance that conditions on the application covariates as well as the
gamble responses.
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Figure 3.1: Distribution of Relative Risk Tolerance













NOTE: The solid line shows the empirical distribution of the survey responses. The solid curve shows the
tted distribution of the true level of risk tolerance: θ = exp(x) using the model from Section 3.4. The
dashed curved shows the tted empirical distribution: exp(ξ) = exp(x + ε).
CHAPTER IV
Labor Income and Heterogeneity in Household Portfolios
4.1 INTRODUCTION
There is considerable heterogeneity in the degree of risk that households assume in their
nancial portfolios, yet the underlying sources of these dierences are not well understood.1
A large number of households with nancial assets do not own any stocks directly in spite of
the high average return on stocks relative to riskless assets. In contrast, a modest fraction
of stock owners hold most of their nancial assets in stocks. These patterns highlight the
wide disparity in nancial portfolios across households. There are a number of possible
candidates to explain this heterogeneity, such as dierences in risk tolerance, xed costs of
stock ownership or other barriers to entry that vary across households, and dierences in
the riskiness or magnitude of households non-nancial wealth. Previous empirical research
has found some evidence for each of these explanations, albeit typically in reduced-form
estimation and with much of the observed variation in portfolios left unexplained.2
In this paper, I quantify the amount of variation in nancial portfolios explained by
measured dierences in risk preference and human capital. Specically, I compare the actual
stock allocation of households with their predicted allocation from a fully parameterized,
structural model. While the models of asset allocation that I examine are well established
1A recent volume (Guiso, Haliassos and Jappelli 2002) and chapter (Curcuru, Heaton, Lucas and Moore 2005) on household
portfolios provide a comprehensive overview of the literature and references. While there are some well established patterns in
household portfolios, such as the more educated tend to hold more risky assets, there is no consensus on the mechanism behind
this association.
2As examples of this work, Barsky et al. (1997) and Kimball et al. (2007) establish a positive relationship between risk
tolerance and the share of nancial assets held in stocks. Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) estimates that a low level of annual xed
costs could explain a large portion of non-participation. Several papers provide some evidence that individuals with riskier human
capital hold less risky nancial portfolios (Vissing-Jorgensen 2002, Heaton and Lucas 2000, Guiso, Jappelli and Terlizzese 1996).
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in the literature, my approach in the empirical analysis is novel.3 I use detailed information
in the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) and administrative earnings records to establish
parameter values at the household level for risk preference, the distribution of future labor
income, and the ratio of current nancial assets to labor income. For each household in my
sample, I solve three standard models that dier only in their treatment of labor income and
obtain the predicted stock allocations.
The comparison of actual stock allocations and the model predictions conrms a role for
the dierences in risk preference; however, there is little evidence that households integrate
their human capital in nancial portfolio decisions. In the rst model where households
only dier in their risk preference, the correlation of the model prediction with actual stock
allocations is 0.16. When the model includes a certain ow of future labor income, the
correlation drops sharply to -0.12. So the households that the second model predicts to have
above average stock allocations are, in fact, the households who have below average stock
allocations in the data. The intuition for the model prediction is that households with large
amounts of riskless human capital relative to their nancial assets should tilt their nancial
assets toward risky assets to achieve a desired allocation in their total wealth (human capital
plus nancial assets). As a result, the model with labor income tends to assign high stock
allocations to households with low levels of nancial assets. These are exactly the households
who are least likely to actually own stocks. The third model which incorporates the riskiness
of future labor income does soften this result, but the correlation between the actual and
predicted allocations is still negative at -0.06. Even when the household-specic measures of
labor income risk are increased by 50% the correlation between the actual and predicted stock
allocation only increases to 0.02. Altogether, my results provide strong evidence against the
systematic integration of human capital in households' nancial portfolios.4
3Scholz et al. (2006) is a recent example of household-specic calibration in the retirement saving literature. Numerical
models in the portfolio choice literature, such as Cocco et al. (1997), are typically calibrated for a representative agent or for a
small number of agent groups, such as education groups.
4My results are consistent with other research in portfolio choice and recent events that also provide evidence against the
integration of human capital, such as holding of own-company stocks, as in the well-publicized case of Enron, and not holding
foreign company stocks (home bias) that are less correlated with own human capital than domestic company stocks.
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The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 4.2 documents the heterogeneity in household
nancial portfolios. Section 4.3 then describes three standard models of asset allocation.
Section 4.4 uses information in the HRS to calibrate the models at the household level.
Section 4.5 compares the model predictions to actual behavior. The nal section oers
conclusions.
4.2 HETEROGENEITY IN FINANCIAL PORTFOLIOS
I use the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) with its rich demographic and nancial
information to investigate the heterogeneity in household nancial portfolios.5 A study of
older households is actually well suited to understanding dierences in asset allocation, since
a larger fraction of these older households have nancial assets to invest than would be
the case in studies with younger households. Even as these older households in the HRS
approach retirement and accumulate more nancial assets, their current and expected labor
income remains an important component of their total household wealth.
Table 4.1 describes the stock allocation of households in the HRS from 1992 to 2002. The
average share of nancial assets held directly in stocks increases from 0.19 in 1992 to 0.26
in 1998 and then declines to 0.24 in 2002.6 These tabulations only include households with
nancial assets of at least $1,000 (2002 dollars), since asset allocation  not saving  is
the behavior of interest. Table 4.1 also reveals dierences across households in their stock
allocations. The standard deviation of the stock allocations is always greater than 0.30 and
the coecient of variation exceeds 140% in each survey wave. The percent of households who
own stocks does increases over the period, but the stock owners never represent a majority
of the households. Interestingly, a modest fraction of the stock owners (between 27% and
5The Health and Retirement Study began in 1992 as a large biennial panel survey of Americans over the age of 50 and their
spouses. Further information on the survey and the data are available at http://hrsonline.isr.umich.edu.
6The stock allocation of the household is dened as the ratio of its stocks to its nancial assets. Stocks include the net value
of stocks in publicly held corporations, mutual funds; or investment trusts. Financial assets include stocks plus the money in
checking or savings accounts or money market funds; CDs, government savings bonds or Treasury bills; corporate, municipal,
government or foreign bonds or bond funds corporate bonds; and other savings or assets, such as valuable collection, annuity
or trust. The assets held in Individual Retirement Accounts, Keoghs, or employer pensions are not included in the measure of
stock allocation. The information needed to roughly allocate retirement assets between high and low risk assets is only available
in the 1998 and later waves of the HRS. If IRAs and private pensions were included, a majority of households would have
some exposure to the stock market; however, there is a strong positive correlation between the direct ownership of stocks and
ownership of stocks in retirement accounts or pensions.
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44%) have stock allocations of 0.75 or higher. The patterns in asset allocation among HRS
households is qualitatively similar to results from the Survey of Consumer Finances which
includes a wider age-range of households (Heaton and Lucas 2000, Bertaut and Starr-McCluer
2002).
Starting with the bottom panel of Table 4.1, the rest of this paper focuses on a younger
sub-sample of HRS households who also receive labor earnings.7 Specically, the sub-sample
of earners follows HRS households with an initial primary earner in the 1938-1941 birth
cohorts as long as the household reports at least $6,500 in labor earnings. The initial primary
earner is the member of the household with more labor earnings in the 1992 HRS. Among
couples, the main earner is more likely to be male, is slightly older than the spouse, and has
roughly the same level of education as the spouse. The selection criteria for the sub-sample of
earners are restrictive, especially in the later survey waves, so the bottom panel of Table 4.1
includes only 23% to 10% of the households in the top panel. Yet, the patterns in the stock
allocations of the earner sub-sample are very similar to the patterns of all HRS households,
despite the selection criteria. Regardless of how one cuts the data, there is considerable
heterogeneity in the nancial portfolios across households.
4.3 MODELS OF ASSET ALLOCATION
In this section, I describe three models of asset allocation that dier only in their treatment
of labor income. In each of the three models, a household chooses current consumption Cit














s.t Xi,t+1 = (Rb + αit(Rs,t+1 −Rb)) Fit + Yit+1(4.2)
Fit = Xit − Cit(4.3)
0 ≤ αit ≤ 1 ,(4.4)
7The labor earnings of the household combine the individual labor earnings of the nancial respondent and his spouse or
partner. The labor earnings include any wage and salary income; bonuses, overtime, tips, and commissions; income from
professional practice or trade; and other income from a second job or military reserves.
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where pt is a one-year survival probability, β is the utility discount factor, and γi is the
coecient of relative risk aversion. The household allocates its total resources Xit between
consumption Cit and the purchase of nancial assets Fit. There are two nancial assets:
riskless bonds with a one-period gross real return of Rb and stocks with an uncertain gross
real return Rs,t+1. The share of nancial assets allocated to stocks is αit. In addition to
the gross returns from nancial assets, the total resources of next period may include labor
income Yit+1. No short-selling of stocks or margin purchases is permitted, so the stock
allocation αit is between zero and one.
4.3.1 Model with No Labor Income
In the absence of labor income, that is, Yit = 0 ∀ i and t, only risk preference and the
risk-return characteristics of stocks aect asset allocation (Samuelson 1969). Assuming stock
returns Rs,t+1 are log-normally distributed, an analytical solution for the stock allocation αit





The rst term on the right is the inverse coecient of relative risk aversion and summarizes
the household's willingness to bear risk. The allocation also depends on the ratio of the
expected excess return on stocks Et(Rs,t+1)−Rb and the variance of stock returns is σ2s . With
time-constant risk preferences and distributional assumptions on asset returns, a household
maintains this same allocation regardless of age or realized stock returns. This model with
no labor income only predicts heterogeneity in nancial portfolios when households dier in
their risk preferences or expectations regarding asset returns.
4.3.2 Model with Certain Labor Income
For many households labor income is an important source of non-nancial income that
should be integrated in their decisions about consumption and asset allocation. Assume that
labor income process follows a deterministic process, such that:
Yi,t+1 = Gi,t+1Yit(4.6)
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where the household knows the full set of future growth factors Gi,t+1, ...GiT and income Y
at age t. When future labor income is certain, the adjustment of the households' nancial
portfolios is straightforward (Merton 1971). Specically, a household with nancial assets Fit
and a present discounted value of future labor income PDVit(Y ) chooses a stock allocation
of
αCit =
αNit (Fit + PDVit(Y ))
Fit
(4.7)




















The household discounts its stream of riskless future labor income with the riskless bond re-
turn Rb and the one-year survival probabilities pt. With any positive amount of labor income
and holding the other parameters constant, the stock allocation αCit is always higher than
the stock allocation αNit . This higher share of nancial assets in stocks αCit allows the share
of total wealth (nancial assets plus human capital) in stocks to remain at αNit . The adjust-
ment of the nancial portfolio is most dramatic for households with low levels of nancial
assets relative to their future labor income. When nancial assets are a very large portion
of the household's total wealth, there is little dierence between the predicted allocations
of the two models. The introduction of certain labor income means that heterogeneity in
nancial portfolios can arise from dierences in preferences, as well as dierences in the ratio
of current nancial assets to labor income and the expected path of future labor income.
4.3.3 Model with Risky Labor Income
Future labor income is rarely predictable over long horizons, so economic theory has long
recognized that the riskiness of labor income and other background factors should aect
asset allocation (Merton 1971, Mayers 1974). Suppose that next year's labor income Yi,t+1
depends on the current labor income Yit, a predictable growth factor Gi,t+1, and a random
shock εi,t+1 up until retirement at age τ . After retirement, the household receives an income
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Gi,t+1Yitεi,t+1 t < τ
rriYiτ−1 t ≥ τ
.(4.9)
In this parsimonious model of anticipated labor income, all shocks ε while working are
permanent, so labor income growth follows a random walk with a drift. Labor income

























On average, labor income follows its predictable growth path, i.e., E(εit) = 1, however, a
working household also anticipates income shocks with volatility σi and correlation with
stock returns ρi. There is no labor income risk in retirement.
The household maximization problem is now expressed in a value function with total
resources Xit and labor income Yit as the state variables, such that
Vit(Xit, Yit) = max
Cit,Fit,αRit
C1−γiit








0 ≤ αRit ≤ 1 .(4.13)
This value function is homogenous of degree (1− γi), so dividing through by current income
reduces the state space to the ratio of total resources to labor income. For a household before









xi,t+1 = (Rb + (Rs,t+1 −Rb)αRit)fit/(Gi,t+1εi,t+1) + 1(4.15)
0 ≤ αRit ≤ 1 .(4.16)
The relationship between the value functions is Vi,t+1(xi,t+1) = Y γi−1it Vit(Xit, Yit), where cit,
fit, and xit are consumption, nancial assets, and total resources all normalized by current
8This simple specication of the labor income process is similar to the one used in Cocco et al. (1997).
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labor income. In the restated model, the values relative to labor income are important, not
absolute levels. The solution to the model yields the following consumption Euler equation
and rst-order condition for stock allocation:
c−γiit = βptG
−γi
i,t+1Et[(Rb + (Rs,t+1 −Rb)αRit)(ci,t+1εi,t+1)−γi ](4.17)
0 = Et[(Rs,t+1 −Rb)(ci,t+1εi,t+1)−γi ] .(4.18)
There is no analytical solution for the stock allocation αRit , so the model prediction at each
age is solved numerically by backward induction. I use the solution method in Carroll
(2002). Intuitively, households should view their future labor income (or human capital) as
an implicit holding of risky and riskless assets. A household anticipating a relatively large,
low risk stream of labor income should increase its explicit nancial holding of stocks 
as was the case in the model with certain labor income. In contrast a household, whose
human capital, is as a large implicit holding of risky assets should oset these implicit risky
assets in its nancial portfolio. Regardless of how the labor income process is specied, risk
preference remains fundamentally important and determines the optimal stock allocation of
total household wealth. In this third model, the riskiness of labor income is an additional
source of heterogeneity in nancial portfolios.
4.4 HOUSEHOLD PARAMETERS
The predicted stock allocation from each of the theoretical models depends on numer-
ous parameter values. Rather than study a representative household, I assign parameter
values to each household based on their survey information. This allows me to compare
actual behavior and the model predictions at the household level. My approach also diers
from estimating the parameter values that maximize the t between actual stock allocations




Risk preference is a key factor in any economic model of asset allocation and may vary
considerably across households. I use the responses to hypothetical gambles in the HRS to
estimate an individual measure of risk preference as in Barsky et al. (1997) and Kimball et
al. (2007). The rst column of Table 4.2 reports the estimated model of log risk tolerance
estimated. Individuals with more education and higher average income are more risk tolerant,
whereas blacks are less risk tolerant than whites. I use these maximum-likelihood estimates to
compute the expected risk aversion γ of individuals conditional on their gamble responses.
While most individuals are highly risk averse with a mean of 8.5, there is considerable
dispersion in these survey-based risk preferences. The standard deviation of the risk aversion
measure is 3.7 and there is a considerable range in the values from 1.1 to 21.1.
4.4.2 Current Financial Assets and Labor Income
In models with labor income, the predicted stock allocation depends on the ratio of current
nancial assets to labor income. The top panel of Table 4.3 displays the median values of
these two variables across the rst six HRS waves. All dollar amounts are converted to 2002
dollars with the CPI-U. The median value of nancial assets increases from $16,669 in 1992
to $30,000 in 2002 but remains fairly modest. Even as the households approach retirement,
labor earnings are an important component of their resources. The median value of labor
earnings increases from $55,475 in 1992 to $57,252 in 1998 and then declines to $48,758
in 2002. With these patterns in nancial assets and labor earnings, the median ratio of
nancial assets-to-labor earnings starts at 0.31 in 1992 and increases to 0.55 in 2002. Many
households expect future years of labor income, so these low ratios underscore the relative
importance of human capital in the total wealth of the household.
The bottom panel of Table 4.3 repeats these calculations for the subset of households
who directly own stocks. While median labor income is 19-24% higher than in the sample
of earner households, the median stockholder has roughly 2-3 times more nancial assets.
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For stockholders, nancial assets are much more important relative to labor income and this
importance grows over the panel as the assets-to-earnings ratio increases from the 0.79 in
1992 to 1.38 in 2002.
4.4.3 Future Labor Income
The labor income that households expect to receive in the future or their human capital
is another factor in the models of asset allocation that include labor income. There are
parameters for the predictable growth of labor income and the ex-ante distribution of un-
predictable income shocks. I use Social Security administrative records matched to the HRS
to characterize labor earnings prior to retirement. The Wage and Self-employment Income
(WSEI) le contains all the earned income that is reported by employers on W-2 forms and
the self-employment income reported on IRS 1040 Schedule SE. A matched administrative
earnings record for the 1980-1991 period is available for roughly 70% of HRS. The values on
the administrative le are less prone to self-reporting errors and arguably of better quality
than the HRS income reports. The high top-code of $125,000 on this particular version of
the earnings records is binding for less than 0.4% of the income observations.
I estimate the parameters of the income process in equation (4.9) by pooling up to 11 years
of real growth in individual earnings. For this analysis I use a larger sample of all original
households who report some labor income in 1991. I combine wage and salary income, as
well as self-employment income for both members of the household and convert to constant
1992 dollars using the CPI-U. To analyze the growth rates, I compute log dierences and
exclude any growth observation in which income more than triples or falls to one-third of
its previous value. This prevents outliers from driving the estimates. I only include growth
rates for households with a main earner ages 35 to 64 in 1991. The second column of Table
4.2 provides the estimated model of real earnings growth. Higher education increases the
mean of earnings growth and there is a predictable decline in earnings growth with age.
These coecient estimates are used to construct a set of growth factors G51 −G64 for each
household based on the covariates of its primary earner.
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The regression of earnings growth explains only a small fraction of the observed variance,
so there are sizeable unpredictable movements in earnings growth. In the third column of
Table 4.2, I regress the squared residuals from the earnings growth regression on a set of
time-constant explanatory variables. The less educated, the more risk tolerant, women, and
Hispanics have larger unpredictable movements in their earnings growth. Blacks have smaller
variance in earnings growth than whites. These coecient estimates are used to construct a
household-specic value for the standard deviation of labor income shocks σ. The dispersion
parameter has an average of 0.25 and ranges from 0.18 to 0.34.
The riskiness of labor income also depends on its covariation with the risky asset returns
ρ. In the fourth column of Table 4.2 I estimate a model where the dependent variable is the
product of the earnings growth residual and the demeaned real return on the S&P 500. The
earnings of households with a male or black primary earner are more positively correlated
with asset returns, but the estimated eects are small. I use these coecient estimates to
construct the households covariance between earnings shocks and stock returns and combine
this with the variance of earnings shocks and returns to calculate the correlation parameter.
The correlation is an average of 0.039 and ranges from -0.036 to 0.109.
I assume that all working households expect to retire at age 65 and that their post-
retirement income maintain a xed replacement rate (in real terms) of their nal year of
labor earnings. To assign this parameter, I calculate the average ratio of total household
income (less capital income) in the rst wave after retirement to the total household income
in the previous wave by education group. I only use observations where the primary earner
is age 64-66 at the time of retirement. The replacement rate of pre-retirement income is the
highest for the least educated receive at 91% and the lowest for the most educated receive
at 76%. I assign the household's replacement rate rrτ based on the educational attainment
of the main earner.
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4.4.4 Parameters Common to All Households
I assign the remaining parameters values commonly to all households, including the time
discount factor, survival probabilities, the risk-return characteristics of stocks, and the risk-
less bond return. While there is some subjective information in the HRS that could be used
to assign these parameters at the household level, in this paper, I adopt standard values
from other calibration studies.
I adopt the one-year survival probabilities from the U.S. National Center for Health
Statistics. The age-specic probabilities, p50 − p99, are from 1996 Life Tables for the total
population. To characterize the survival probabilities, a 50-year-old has a 99.5% chance
of reaching age 51, whereas an 80-year-old has a 94.0% chance of living another year. On
average, a 50-year-old expects to live another 29 years. Thus a retirement age of 65 implies
another 15 years of employment and 14 years in retirement on average. At age 100, I assume
the probability of surviving another year is zero, i.e., T = 100. The age of the main earner
determines the relevant survival probability for a household.
I assume that the riskless real return on bonds log(Rb) is 2% and the annual discount
factor for utility β is 0.96. The average excess real return on stocks log(Rs) is 4% and the
standard deviation of stock returns σs is 15.7%. The ex-ante distribution of asset returns
does not vary over time or across households, thus I abstract from the potentially important
dierences in the subjective expectations of asset returns.
4.5 ACTUAL AND PREDICTED ALLOCATIONS
With the three model specications and the household-specic parameter values, I now
compute the predicted stock allocations for each household. With a model prediction for
each household, I can assess the correspondence between the actual and predicted nancial
portfolios at the household-level. The dierent treatment of labor income in the three model
also allows me to isolate the extent to which labor income can account for the observed
heterogeneity in stock allocations.
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The top panel of Table 4.4 compares the actual and predicted stock allocations for the
earner households. For these tabulations, I pool 4,163 observations from 1,223 earner house-
holds in the rst six survey waves. On average households allocate a 0.24 share of their
nancial assets to stocks. The model with no labor income predicts a slightly higher share
of 0.25. When the model integrates labor income, the average prediction for the stock allo-
cation increases considerably to 0.97 with certain income and 0.71 with risky income. The
integration of labor income  a substantial increase in the implicit holdings of low risk assets
 greatly exacerbates the micro version of the equity premium puzzle. Given the relative
security of their future labor earnings, households should be willing to shift their nancial
assets toward stocks to take advantage of their excess return.
The second row of Table 4.4 reports the standard deviation in the actual and model
stock allocations. The actual stock allocation has a large standard deviation of 0.34. The
predictions from the model with no labor income is only half as disperse as the actual stock
allocations with a standard deviation of 0.14. When labor income is certain the standard
deviation of the predicted allocation decreases to 0.12, since many of the households have
allocation at the upper bound of 1.0. Labor income risk creates substantial heterogeneity
in the predicted stock allocations. The standard deviation of 0.33 is similar to the standard
deviation of actual stock allocations. While the predictions from models with labor income
over-state the average share of nancial assets held in stocks, they do mimic the observed
heterogeneity across households in their nancial portfolios.
A more revealing test of the models is the correlation between the actual and predicted
stock allocations reported in the third row of Table 4.4. The model that excludes labor
income has the highest correlation of 0.16 with the actual allocations. The t of this simple
model is well below 1.0, but it arms a positive association between risk tolerance and
stock allocations. When certain labor income is added to the model, the correlation falls
dramatically to -0.12. Riskiness in labor income improves the correlation, but it remains
negative at -0.06. The last column shows that even a large increase in the riskiness of
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labor income, where the standard deviation of earnings shocks σ and their correlation with
risky asset returns ρ are increased by 50% for each household, would only yield a small
positive correlation of 0.02. These results suggest that the dierences in labor income across
households cannot explain the heterogeneity in stock allocations. There is no evidence that
households integrate their human capital in their nancial portfolio decisions.
The bottom panel of Table 4.4 repeats the calculations for the 672 households who own
stocks. Given the low stock market participation rates this is a very selective group of
households. The average share of nancial assets allocated to stocks is 0.55  more than
double the average share among all earner households. In contrast, the predicted stock
allocations for the stockholders in the models are quite similar to the predictions for the
earner households in the top panel. All of the correlations between actual and predicted
stock allocations are small and not statistically dierent from zero at the 5% level. In
particular, this suggests that the variation in risk tolerance is more useful in predicting stock
ownership than the share of nancial assets in stocks. None of the models can account for
the patterns in stock allocation among stock owners.
I use a regression analysis in Table 4.5 to highlight the factors that drive a wedge between
the actual stock allocations of households and their model predictions. The goal is to iden-
tify the sources of the low correlation between the actual and predicted stock allocations.
For each model, I regress the standardized product of the household's actual and predicted
stock allocation on the household's level of nancial assets, ratio of nancial assets to labor
income, and age of the main earner.9 This provides a linear regression model for the corre-
lation between actual and predicted stock allocation. Across all three models with dierent
treatments of labor income, higher levels of household nancial assets are associated with
a higher correlation between actual and predicted stock allocations. None of the models
include xed costs for participation in the stock market, so the inability of the models to
predict the low stock allocations of households with few nancial assets is not surprising.
9For the standardized product, I subtract the sample mean of the actual and predicted allocation before calculating the
product and then normalize this product by the product of the standard deviations for the actual and predicted allocations.
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However, the absence of xed costs in the models is just one reason for a poor t between
the model predictions and actual behavior. Among households with the same level of nan-
cial assets, there is also a lower correlation between the actual and predicted allocation for
households with high levels of nancial assets relative to their labor income. So even among
households with high levels of nancial assets  or those households for whom the absolute
monetary costs of ignoring human capital are more substantial  there is evidence against
the integration of human capital in the nancial portfolio decision.
4.6 CONCLUSION
The direct comparison of actual stock allocations and predicted allocations from economic
models with labor income shows that households do not systematically integrate their human
capital in their nancial portfolio decisions. An important feature of this analysis is the
use of household-specic measures of both income risk and risk preference. The potential
eects of heterogeneous risk preferences are typically not addressed in the empirical studies
of asset allocation with human capital. Yet, there is empirical evidence that individuals
select into riskier careers based on their risk preference (Fuchs-Schuendeln and Schuendeln
2005, Sahm 2007). Furthermore, the same level of income risk would have dierent eects
across individuals with dierent levels of risk tolerance. If I constrain all households to have
the average risk aversion of 8.5, the mean of the predicted allocations is unaected, but the
correlation between the model predictions with labor income and the actual stock allocation
worsens considerably. The correlation falls to -0.19 from -0.12 with certain income and to
-0.28 from -0.06 with risky income. These results underscore that the heterogeneity in risk
preferences is an important source of the heterogeneity in nancial portfolios.
Consistent with previous reduced-form estimation of asset allocation, I do nd that house-
holds with riskier labor income hold less risky nancial portfolios. However, if households
made their investment decisions on the basis of total wealth, the average stock allocation
in nancial assets would be higher, particularly among households with low nancial asset-
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to-labor earnings ratios. The implicit holdings of low risk assets in human capital result
in a much larger equity premium puzzle. This outcome is trivial in the model with certain
labor income, but is not guaranteed when labor income is risky. In particular, a suciently
positive correlation between labor income growth and stock market returns could lead to less
risky nancial portfolios when human capital is included. Yet, the time series of household
labor income in the HRS administrative earnings les does not show such patterns. The
negative correlation between actual stock allocations and the predicted stock allocations in
the models with labor income suggests that either human capital is not an important factor
in the nancial portfolio decision of households or is not adequately captured in the standard
model.
With the expansion of dened contribution pensions and proposals to introduce individual
accounts to Social Security, the asset allocation decisions of households will likely have an
increasing impact on their nancial resources and welfare in retirement. It is important to
understand the actual sources of heterogeneity in nancial portfolios, since the appropriate
policy response, if any, would depend on the particular source. The results in this paper sug-
gest that dierences in risk preference across households and xed costs of stock ownership
likely account for some of the dierences in actual stock allocations. While there are the-
oretically important dierences across households in their human capital, the actual stock
allocations of households do not reect their human capital as economic theory predicts.
Households who fail to take a broad view of their economic wealth may needlessly forgo the
excess returns of stocks and may not properly diversify the risks in their human capital and
nancial assets. The end result of households not integrating their human capital is less and
possibly more volatile nancial resources in retirement.
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Table 4.1: Allocation of Financial Assets in Stocks, 1992-2002
HRS Wave
Stock Allocation 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
All Households
Mean 0.19 0.22 0.24 0.26 0.26 0.24
Standard Deviation 0.30 0.32 0.34 0.36 0.36 0.35
% Greater than Zero 39 43 44 45 44 44
% 0.75 or Higher 10 13 15 17 18 16
Number of Households 5,366 4,954 4,718 4,547 4,471 4,311
Sub-Sample of Earners
Mean 0.19 0.24 0.26 0.29 0.26 0.25
Standard Deviation 0.31 0.33 0.35 0.37 0.36 0.35
% Greater than Zero 39 43 46 48 44 43
% 0.75 or Higher 11 14 17 20 19 17
Number of Households 1,245 1,010 821 670 567 428
NOTE: Author's tabulations of the Rand HRS data set (Version D) use the household survey weights. The
top panel includes all households in the HRS study group who report nancial assets greater than $1,000 in
2002 dollars at a particular survey wave. The stock allocation is the ratio of the net value of stocks held
directly by the household to its total nancial assets (excluding IRAs). The bottom panel includes a
sub-sample of the households in the top panel whose primary wage earner in 1992 is in the 1938 to 1941
birth cohorts and is still working at a particular survey wave. See the text for more details on the variable
and sample denitions.
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Table 4.2: Coecient Estimates in Assignment of Model Parameters
Dependent Variable
Real Growth Square of Product of
Log Risk Rate of Unpredictable Earnings Growth
Explanatory Variable Tolerance Earnings Earnings Growth and Stock Returns
Constant -3.38 -0.309 0.071 0.001
(0.32) (0.094) (0.002) (0.0004)
Male 0.05 0.0003 -0.017 0.001
(0.04) (0.003) (0.002) (0.0003)
Black -0.20 0.006 -0.013 0.001
(0.07) (0.004) (0.002) (0.0005)
Hispanic 0.07 0.003 0.026 -0.001
(0.09) (0.005) (0.003) (0.0007)
High School Drop Out 0.01 0.003 0.013 0.0003
(0.06) (0.004) (0.002) (0.0005)
Some College 0.17 0.007 -0.00001 -0.001
(0.05) (0.004) (0.002) (0.0005)
College Graduate 0.14 0.015 0.0003 -0.001
(0.07) (0.005) (0.003) (0.0006)
Post Graduate 0.26 0.016 -0.012 -0.001
(0.06) (0.005) (0.003) (0.0005)
Average FEP 1.16
(0.11)
Log of Average Income 0.09
(0.03)






Risk Tolerance 0.007 0.030 0.001
(0.014) (0.009) (0.0018)
Log-Likelihood -20185.3
R2 0.003 0.006 0.001
Number of Individuals 11,255 4,039 4,039 4,039
Number of Observations 16,851 39,741 39,741 39,741
Used to Assign Parameter γ G σ ρ
NOTE: Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses. Estimates in bold are statistically signicant at the
5% level. The maximum-likelihood estimation in the rst column uses the hypothetical gamble responses
from 1992-2002 and allows heteroscedasticity in the survey response error. Fraction exact probability is the
fraction of subjective probability questions to which the respondent gave a non-focal answer (not 0, 50, or
100). Averages in the rst column are calculated for an individual over up to six survey waves. The OLS
estimation of the earnings process in the last three column uses the matched Social Security administrative
earnings records from 1980-1991.
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Table 4.3: Current Financial Assets and Labor Earnings
Median Value in HRS Wave
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
Earner Households
Financial Assets 16,669 24,278 23,505 28,641 24,028 30,000
Labor Earnings 55,475 54,779 57,252 54,923 52,911 48,758
Assets-to-Earnings Ratio 0.31 0.43 0.42 0.49 0.46 0.55
Number of Households 1,245 1,010 821 670 567 428
Stockholder and Earner
Financial Assets 56,419 55,233 58,989 78,361 91,820 84,250
Labor Earnings 66,043 64,739 70,827 65,011 62,360 59,628
Assets-to-Earnings Ratio 0.79 0.81 0.84 1.26 1.52 1.38
Number of Households 449 415 352 303 232 172
NOTE: All dollar values are converted to 2002 dollars with the CPI-U. See text for the denition of
nancial assets and labor earnings.
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Table 4.4: Comparison of Actual and Predicted Stock Allocations
Labor Income in Model
Actual None Certain Risky Riskier
Earner Households
Mean 0.24 0.25 0.97 0.71 0.47
Standard Deviation 0.34 0.14 0.12 0.33 0.37
Correlation with Actual 1.00 0.16 -0.12 -0.06 0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Stockholders
Mean 0.55 0.28 0.95 0.69 0.48
Standard Deviation 0.31 0.16 0.14 0.32 0.35
Correlation with Actual 1.00 0.01 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
NOTE: Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses. Pooling across 1992-2002 waves, there are 4163
observations from 1223 Earner Households and 1810 observations from 672 Stockholders. See the text for
details on the model specication. The last column analyzes the predicted allocation from the model with
risky labor income where the assigned parameters of labor income risk (σ and ρ) have been inated by 50%.
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Table 4.5: Decomposition of Stock Allocation Correlations
Dependent Variable
Product of Actual and
Predicted by Labor Income
Explanatory Variables None Certain Risky
Log of Financial Assets 0.042 0.136 0.081
(0.015) (0.020) (0.013)
Asset-to-Earnings Ratio 0.003 -0.213 -0.085
(0.012) (0.032) (0.011)
Age / 10 0.038 -0.001 -0.021
(0.048) (0.057) (0.044)
Constant -0.482 -1.210 -0.650
(0.305) (0.377) (0.270)
R2 0.004 0.114 0.025
NOTE: Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses. Estimates in bold are statistically signicant at the
5% level. The product of the demeaned actual stock allocation and the demeaned predicted stock
allocation for each household are divided by the standard deviation of the actual and predicted allocation
in the pooled cross-section.
CHAPTER V
Conclusion
The three papers in this dissertation explore the measurement of individual risk tolerance
and its usefulness in understanding asset allocation. The rst two papers improve on the
estimation techniques for inferring the coecient of relative risk tolerance from the hypo-
thetical income gambles on the Health and Retirement Study. The third paper employs this
measure of risk tolerance in a test of whether households integrate their human capital in
their nancial portfolio decisions. The research in this dissertation contributes to a growing
literature on the survey-based measurement of individual preference parameters and recog-
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